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ABSTRACT
Renewed efforts to bring science and technology to the
center of economic revival in developing nations recognize the
centrality of the university in the creation and promotion of science
and innovation.
Many developed nations, following the
paradigmatic U.S. technology transfer system, transfer their
academic innovations to industry—through licensing intellectual
property—for eventual commercialization. While conventional
wisdom places the Carter era Bayh-Dole legislation at the center of
that successful American system, this Article argues that the U.S.
biotechnology and high tech booms are more likely attributable to
the confluence of unique and propitious conditions, and that BayhDole played a marginal role in the commercialization of American
academic ingenuity and the resulting socioeconomic prosperity.
Instead, this Article suggests that Bayh-Dole’s legacy is chiefly the
ubiquitous university technology transfer office, at best a drain on
limited university resources, but potentially a major impediment in
the innovation and commercialization process.
After reviewing Bayh-Dole and similar efforts in other
nations, the author advocates an alternative system for those
developing (and even developed) nations seeking to grow their
economies through the commercialization of academic inventions.
In contrast to the inefficient local technology transfer office,
this Article suggests a centralized and independent office that
would have the infrastructure, informatics and incentives necessary
to take advantage of economies of scale in the patenting, licensing
and marketing of academic research. With recent studies now
suggesting that patents woefully under-incentivize academic
researchers, this system would provide a more relevant incentive to
promote the commercialization of academic research. This
streamlined and efficient process would allow researchers to trade
their intellectual property rights, forgoing unlikely future royalty
streams, for a more enticing and less risky research grant with a
value tied to the expected value of the patented innovation. The
innovation, once acquired and patented by the central technology
office, would then be offered to industry via a flat rate nonexclusive license, relieving the current debilitating and inhibitory
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transaction costs, and diffusing the technology efficiently, rapidly
and broadly throughout society.
INTRODUCTION
Representatives of the fifty-three member African Union
gathered recently in Ethiopia to discuss one of the most critical
issues in Africa and the developing world: Science. 1 At the
summit, keynote speaker Calestous Juma emphasized the
importance of “[b]ringing science and technology to the centre of
Africa’s economic renewal,” and underscored the centrality of
universities and research institutions in the creation of science and
technological innovation. 2
Although Africa made scientific
growth a priority earlier in the century, “[t]hroughout the 1980s
and 1990s, science and technology investments were not
prioritised despite considerable empirical evidence . . . showing

A PDF version of this Article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2937. Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete
Journal archive.
*
Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for Law and the Biosciences, Stanford Law School
2007-2008; J.D., Berkeley Law (Boalt Hall), University of California, Berkeley, 2004;
Ph.D., Genetics/Bioinformatics, Yale University, 2004; M.Phil., Yale University, 2002.
Thank you to the Branco Weiss Society in Science Fellowship, Swiss Federal Insititute of
Technology (“ETH”), Zurich for its generous support. Thank you also to Professors
John Barton, Mark Gerstein, Hank Greely, Olaf Kübler, Mark Lemley, Robert Merges,
and Joshua Sarnoff.
1
8th African Union Summit, Addis Ababa, Eth., Jan. 22–30, 2007, http://www.africaunion.org/root/AU/Conferences/Past/2007/January/summit/summit1.htm (last visited Jan.
30, 2009).
2
Calestous Juma, Professor of the Practice of Int’l Dev., Belfer Ctr. for Sci. and Int’l
Affairs, Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Harvard Univ., The New Culture of Innovation: Africa
in the Age of Technological Opportunities, Keynote Address at the 8th African Union
Summit (Jan. 29, 2007), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/juma_au_summit_
keynote_jan_29_2007.pdf; see also Kofi Annan, Science for All Nations, 13 SCIENCE
925, 925 (2004). Other groups have also highlighted the importance of science and
innovation in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (or “MDGs”): “The role that
science and technology play in the attainment of the MDGs is implicit in the Millennium
Declaration adopted by the Heads of States.” AFRICAN MINISTERIAL COUNCIL ON SCI. &
TECH. (“AMCOST”), AFRICA’S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CONSOLIDATED PLAN OF
ACTION 9 (2006), available at http://www.nepadst.org/doclibrary/pdfs/ast_cpa_2007.pdf.
The eight United Nations Millennium Development Goals can be found at
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
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that investment in science and technology yields direct and indirect
benefits to national economies.” 3
Developing nations, now intent on integrating themselves into
the global knowledge economy, becoming self-reliant, and
fostering sustainable development, have only recently revisited the
connection between promoting local scientific innovation and a
strong economy.
Many nations are now working toward
harnessing and applying science and innovation within their
borders.
Historically, scientific innovation has been an integral
component to national development and growth. 4 Postwar success
stories in Europe, and more recently in Asia, are often touted as
proof of concept. 5 Externalities from scientific innovation also
extend beyond pure economic development: indigenous science
and technology can help create solutions to specific regional and
local problems that themselves impede innovation, such as health
or agricultural issues. Further, basic research innovations often
have consequences and ramifications beyond their specific and
particular goals, eventually becoming part of a feedback loop that
fuels the engine of local innovation and productivity. 6
3
AMCOST, supra note 2, at 8 (“In many countries infrastructure for R&D has been
neglected and is decaying. Institutions of higher education, particularly universities and
technical colleges, are in urgent need of renewal after many years of neglect and
disorientation from local and national priorities.”).
4
“Since the Industrial Revolution, the growth of economies throughout the world has
been driven largely by the pursuit of scientific understanding, the application of
engineering solutions, and continual technological innovation.” NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. &
NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM: ENERGIZING AND
EMPLOYING AMERICA FOR A BRIGHTER ECONOMIC FUTURE 41 (2006).
5
There is a substantial body of literature on the nature and causes of Asian postwar
success. See generally Robert Wade, East Asia’s Economic Success: Conflicting
Perspectives, Partial Insights, Shaky Evidence, 44 WORLD POL. 270 (1992). “Over the
past two decades a literature big enough to fill a small airplane hangar has been produced
on the causes of East Asian economic success.” Id. Note that, like the rise of American
science, there are numerous factors that have led to the success of science in Japan as
well as Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. See generally Boris Holzer,
Miracles with a System: The Economic Rise of East Asia and the Role of Sociocultural
Patterns, 15 INT’L SOC. 455 (2000).
6
It also is thought to limit the brain drain to more developed nations. See, e.g., David
Dickson, Turning The Brain Drain From A Threat To Opportunity, SCI. & DEV.
NETWORK, Nov. 2, 2007, available at http://www.scidev.net/en/science-and-innovationpolicy/editorials/turning-the-brain-drain-from-threat-to-opportunity.html (discussing how
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Striving to recreate the prior successes in now-developed
nations, many developing nations, often with unrealistic
expectations, 7 look to re-enact the American technology transfer
successes, linked by many to the Carter era Bayh-Dole legislation. 8
With the growing appreciation of the university’s function as the
central scientific and technological innovator—particularly in
developing nations with little to no appreciable technological
infrastructure 9 —many scholars, non-governmental organizations
(or “NGOs”), and local politicians in both developed and
developing nations have suggested importing Bayh-Dole-like

a recurring brain drain may induce developing nations to limit their investment in science
education and noting that developing countries need to provide their scientists with the
proper incentives to continue their research in developing nations).
7
See, e.g., A.D. Heher, Implications of International Technology Transfer
Benchmarks for Developing Countries, 4 INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. & SUSTAINABLE DEV.
207, 207 (2005).
8
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2006); see ORG. FOR ECON.
COOPERATION & DEV. (OECD), A NEW ECONOMY? THE CHANGING ROLE OF INNOVATION
AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN GROWTH 9 (2000) (noting that many OECD nations
see Bayh-Dole as a major factor in the success of science in the United States). In the
United States, the Bayh-Dole Act (1980), which extended patent protection to publicly
funded research, helped to strengthen the role of science in the innovation process and
was an early step in facilitating industry-university collaboration. Since then, further
policy reform in this area has facilitated innovative performance. A recent analysis of
United States patent citations found, for example, that more than 70% of citations in
biotechnology were to papers originating solely at public science institutions, while a
study of scientific publications in the United Kingdom showed that the proportion of
articles authored by industry scientists with an academic co-author rose from 20% in
1981 to 40% in 1991. Id.; see also COMM. ON UTILIZATION OF TECHS., NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, RUSSIAN ACAD. OF SCI., TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION: RUSSIAN
CHALLENGES, AMERICAN LESSONS 85 (Nat’l Acad. Press 1998) (“A joint working group
could be established to consider the relevance of the provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act to
Russian conditions.”); Ken Howard, Global Biotech Expansion Taking Cues from BayhDole¸ BIOENTREPRENEUR, May 20, 2004, http://www.nature.com/bioent/bioenews/
052004/full/bioent811.html.
9
See, e.g., GARETH WILLIAMS, JAMES ROBERTSON & MIKE GILBERT, MARKS AND
CLERK BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT 2007, at 17–20 (2007) (noting that most of the influential
patents, as measured by citations, come from universities, and that American universities
tend to be domestic patent leaders in terms of sheer numbers of patents). But see David
Mowery, The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and University-Industry Technology Transfer: A
Policy Model for Other Governments? 2, http://www.merid.org/bayh-dole/BDRF
paper_Mowery.pdf (noting that most industries look to open science).
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legislation, to help promote the transfer of knowledge and
technical know-how from the university to industry. 10
Further, regional scientists in developing nations are quickly
learning that joint ventures and collaborations with more affluent
labs, and the access to knowledge and technical knowhow which
comes with such interactions, is indispensible in growing local
science. 11 But these interactions require that those labs in
developing nations provide similar levels of intellectual property
protection as their developed brethren to alleviate much of the
unfortunate mistrust and suspicion. 12
These and other
requirements necessary to interact in the modern academic science
world necessitate the incorporation of intellectual property laws
into the everyday workings of the developing world’s science
laboratories.
Notwithstanding this global interest in promoting university to
industry transfer, there is a shortage of scholarly work on the
promotion of innovation and scientific advancement in developing
nations, and, in particular, the effect of Bayh-Dole-like legislation
on developing nations’ economies and academies. The lack of a
10

See, e.g., Press Release, Arizona State University, Innovate or Perish? Helping
Developing Countries Fight Neglected Diseases (Oct. 25, 2005), http://www.
eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2005-10/asu-iop102405.php (discussing the exportation of
Bayh-Dole to other countries); see also Goldie Blumenstyk, Turning Research—Slowly—
Into Riches, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 7, 2005 (discussing Bayh-Dole-like
legislation in Europe). See generally SARA BOETTIGER & ALAN BENNETT, THE BAYHDOLE ACT’S EFFECTS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION,
http://www.merid.org/bayh-dole/Boettiger%20BDRF%20Paper%20v3%20_final_.pdf
(draft report for The Rockefeller Foundation); Karim Maredia, Frederic Erbisch & Maria
Sampaio, Technology Transfer Offices for Developing Countries, 43 BIOTECH. & DEV.
MONITOR 15 (1997); Jerry Thursby & Marie Thursby, University Licensing Under BayhDole: What are the Issues and Evidence?, May 2003, http://opensource.mit.edu/
papers/Thursby.pdf. Ironically one of the many criticisms of Bayh-Dole has been the
resulting shift by research institutions away from unprofitable developing nation-oriented
research—i.e., tropical diseases—to more profitable diseases of affluence. Note,
however, that many developing nations may also be suffering with these diseases. See
Majid Ezzati et al., Rethinking the “Diseases of Affluence” Paradigm: Global Patterns of
Nutritional Risks in Relation to Economic Development, 2 PLOS MED. 0404 (2005),
available
at
http://medicine.plosjournals.org/perlserv?request=get-document&
doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0020133.
11
See generally Clemente Forero-Pineda, The Impact of Stronger Intellectual Property
Rights on Science and Technology in Developing Countries, 35 RES. POL’Y 808 (2006).
12
Id.
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rigorous empirical analysis has resulted in this aforementioned
inadvertent promotion of misinformation regarding the ability of
developing nations to mimic American and Western European
successes in innovation simply through importing Bayh-Dole like
legislation. 13
Much of the current conversation on optimal methodologies for
promoting innovation in developing nations suggests a
misunderstanding of the role of the Bayh-Dole legislation in the
current success of science and innovation in the United States.
Simplistically, other potentially more important factors are often
overlooked: a great deal of Bayh-Dole’s purported successes in the
United States must be credited to a preexisting strong and
expansive intellectual property regime, a recognition of the
market’s importance in promoting innovation and development,
preexisting interactions and collaborations between industry and
academia, an emerging culture of academic patenting, a preexisting academic entrepreneurial spirit, extensive venture capital
markets, and an exceedingly well-funded high quality research
system.
Nevertheless, developing nations on the cusp of innovation—
i.e., many of those nations that fall within the World Bank’s
Middle Income Developing Nation categorization14 —need to
implement some form of system to promote the transfer of their
academic basic research to the private sector for further
development and commercialization. “Corporate America is
increasingly moving academic research programs to schools
overseas, particularly to the developing world, where results are
outstanding, costs are low and arguments over IP are
nonexistent.” 15 Now is the time to take advantage of these newly

13

See, e.g., Frank Rothaermel, Shanti Agung & Lin Jiang, University
Entrepreneurship: a Taxonomy of the Literature, 16 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 691 (2007)
(providing an exhaustive review of the relevant literature), available at
http://olympus.cs.cmu.edu/links/rothaermel-4002-3-T.pdf.
14
See, e.g., Country Classification Definitions, The World Bank Group,
http://www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/classgroups.htm (last visited Nov. 23,
2008).
15
Thomas K. Grose, A Challenging Matchup: Time Consuming Wrangling Over
Intellectual Property Issues is Affecting the Relationship Between Academia and
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developing collaborations and institutionalize some form of
academia to industry technology transfer schema. This Article
suggests a promising new methodology for developing nations,
allowing them to simultaneously reap potential pecuniary gains
from their growing research sectors and to promote local science
and innovation.
The first half of the Article delves into an analysis of the
current state of university to industry technology transfer within
the United States. The Article provides a critical analysis of the
Bayh-Dole Act 16 and the historic developments leading up to its
conception. This historical review attempts to establish the
centrality of some particular extrinsic factors, including concurrent
scientific developments, market driven forces, and other legislation
that were relevant for the boom in American innovation. By
highlighting these factors, the Article hopes to diminish the
perceived relevance and importance of the Bayh-Dole legislation
itself within the rapid expansion of American innovation. 17
In particular, this Article will first review the basic history of
United States technology transfer between universities and
industry, starting from the Morrill Act of 1862 18 and culminating
in the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act. Through establishing the
unique nature of the historical and academic environment in the
development of the U.S. technology transfer phenomenon, this
Article would hope to dissuade other nations from thinking that
creating a similar piece of legislation would guarantee similar
results.
The following section will establish the contention that the
Bayh-Dole Act, while not directly responsible for the present state
of affairs vis-à-vis technology transfer in universities, can be
Industry, 15 AM. SOC’Y FOR ENGINEERING EDUC. (“ASEE”) PRISM 18, 20 (2006),
available at http://www.prism-magazine.org/feb06/feature_IntellectualProperty.cfm.
16
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2006).
17
But see generally Nat’l Acads. Bd. on Sci., Tech. & Econ. Policy, Comm. on
Intellectual Prop. Rights in the Knowledge-Based Econ., Workshop on Academic IP:
Effects of University Patenting and Licensing on Commercialization and Research
(2001), http://www7.nationalacademies.org/step/ipwkshp_PDF.pdf (unedited verbatim
transcript of the conference of Apr. 17, 2001, “Intellectual Property Rights: How Far
Should They Be Extended?”).
18
Morrill Act of 1862, 7 U.S.C. §§ 301–308 (2006).
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shown to be the impetus for the ubiquitous technology transfer
office (or “TTO”)—a consistent thorn in the side of many
researchers and businesses alike—and an actual bottleneck in the
innovation process. Any implementation of Bayh-Dole-like
legislation would necessitate the creation of a local equivalent to
the United States technology transfer office—an ineffectual and
ultimately undesirable result.
The next section looks to the particular effects of academiaindustry technology transfer on universities in the United States,
noting both positive and negative effects, including potentially
limiting the extent of research fraud, and the growth of material
transfer agreements.
Any developing nation interested in
implementing its own system of technology transfer should be
aware of the strengths and limitations of the American system of
technology transfer. Determining where the American system has
resulted in positive and negative externalities will allow
developing nations the opportunity to cherry-pick the superior
aspects of the United States system while leaving behind the
flawed components.
The second half of this Article—a proposed alternative to
Bayh-Dole-like legislation—is directed primarily at developing
nations. With the understanding that Bayh-Dole-like regulations—
particularly the granting of intellectual property rights to
universities and not the inventing academic researchers, and the
regulatory hoops that Bayh-Dole requires in order for the
university to retain that intellectual property19 —are encumbrances
rather than impetuses to innovation. This Article suggests
reforming or preventing the creation of the technology transfer
office—the most significant result of the Bayh-Dole Act. As the
19
See April L. Butler, Stealing Thunder from Government Contractors: Thwarting the
Intent of The Bayh-Dole Act in Campbell Plastics v. Brownlee, 31 U. DAYTON L. REV.
477, 477–78 (2006) (“Government contractors: proceed with caution—if you make one
wrong move, the Government may steal your invention. Now, the tough part is . . .
making sure you immediately document it on an exact form, within the exact time frame,
and with significant detail. The Bayh-Dole Act . . . has turned into an opportunity for the
Government to take advantage of small business firms who require its support. The
effect of the Bayh-Dole Act has become hazy by the recent decision of Campbell Plastics
v. Brownlee, which has done little to guide future claims and has left government
contractors with paperwork anxiety.”).
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primary implementer of commercialization of academic research,
much of the failures attributed to Bayh-Dole can be traced back to
these offices, each arguably an unfortunate necessity for the
university’s implementation of its side of the Bayh-Dole bargain.
A central tenant of this Article’s proposed solution lies in the
abolishment of technology transfer offices, as we know them, and
a reformulating of the ideas that necessitated their creation.
Simplistically, this solution would look to a centralized
organization or government agency to essentially buy out a
scientist’s intellectual property (or “IP”) risk—her future and
perhaps somewhat unlikely revenue streams from her innovations.
This entity would then non-exclusively license out that academic
scientific research at a flat rate to industry for commercialization.
Notably, as opposed to the current system in the United States and
many other developed nations, this proposal would require the
implementation of a Hochschullehrerprivileg, i.e., an academic
exception to the common patent regulation that automatically
transfers ownership of an employee’s innovation to the
employer. 20
As this Article will point out, many of the particular issues with
local technology transfer offices can be remedied through the use
of a regional or national office that deals with the inventors, not the
administrators at the university. Of particular interest is the
possibility that a centralized system could remove encumbering
conflicts of interest and take advantage of economies of scale,
reducing transaction costs and broadening the target audience for
each piece of innovation. Nonetheless, technology transfer offices
may still be necessary in some research universities; these offices
would simplify the proposed system by evaluating and prosecuting
the patents prior to transferring the IP rights to the centralized
agency. Note that these offices would be treated as core facilities
by the university—not-for-profit components of a research facility

20
See Christian Kilger & Kurt Bartenbach, New Rules for German Professors, 298
SCIENCE 1173, 1173 (2002).
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designed only to support the research endeavors without the need
to financially justify their existence or maximize revenue. 21
Inevitably, some academic innovations will require an
exclusive license in order to fully incentivize industry
involvement. In these instances, licensees would be able to take an
exclusive license, although with a viral clause requiring the
reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing of the IP and possibly
even the derivative innovations back to academia. 22
With many scientists generally uninterested in the
commercialization of their research, this particular system would
provide novel and appreciable incentives in the form of grants for
researchers to hand over the IP rights in their developments,
without the need for obtrusive and pushy technology transfer
officers. The system would also allow, and potentially even
encourage, scientists to hold on to their intellectual property rights
when the researchers feel that they can better license the science or
technology themselves—a proven strategy when commercializing
early innovations, and a promising approach to inculcate an
entrepreneurial culture into developed and developing nations’
academic research and, according to many, the next step in the
evolution of academia.
Imposing a new system of technology transfer may not even be
that radical and, as such, more likely to be implemented in the
context of developing nations. Recent research into the status of
technology transfer in developing nations indicates that most
universities are currently woefully under-equipped to handle the
complexities of patenting and licensing of basic science research. 23
As such, this proposed system might be just as easily implemented
as any other system currently available to developing nations.

21

See Howard Hughes Med. Inst. (“HHMI”), Core Facilities at Medical Schools Help
Power Biomedical Research, HHMI SCI. EDUC. NEWS, Oct. 15, 1997,
http://www.hhmi.org/news/core.html.
22
See, e.g., Phil Albert, GPL: Viral Infection or Just Your Imagination?,
LINUXINSIDER, May 25, 2004, http://www.linuxinsider.com/story/33968.html (offering a
layman’s explanation of the GPL viral copyright license).
23
See Julie Stackhouse & Rachel Day, Global and Regional Practices in University
Research Management: Emerging Trends, 4 INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. & SUSTAINABLE DEV.
189, 190–99 (2005).
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Notwithstanding this focus on developing nations, the proposed
system of university-to-industry technology transfer may also be
relevant for developed nations as well, including the United States.
Still, it is less likely to be adopted in the United States as it
requires a fundamental overhaul of the current entrenched
system. 24 Nevertheless, supporting the contention that such a
system could be introduced, even in the United States, a recent
survey of more than 1,800 U.S. life scientists suggests that the vast
majority of researchers had little to no interaction with industry
and few if any patents, with only 8% of the respondents ever
receiving any form of patent royalties; 25 the current system may
not be as ingrained into the research process as conventional
wisdom might imply.

24
The proposed system would look to inventors themselves as the primary owners of
the innovation—passing the proposed benefits of the system to the inventor and
circumventing the academic institution. Under Bayh-Dole, “although title still vests in
the named inventor, the inventor remains under a legal obligation to assign his interest
either to the government or the nonprofit contractor . . . .” Bd. of Trustees of the Leland
Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1118 (N.D.
Cal. 2007) (interpreting Bayh-Dole to give the government the right of first refusal and
the academic institution the right of second refusal, ahead of the named inventor); see
also Fenn v. Yale Univ., 184 Fed. App’x 21, 23 (2d Cir. 2006) (denying the National
Institutes of Health’s ability to allow the named inventor to retain the rights to his
invention if the academic institution has yet to elect to retain the rights to the same
invention); FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 982 F.2d 1546, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (noting
that Bayh-Dole divests the patentee of all interests in her invention, by operation of law,
then the academic institution can acquire those interests by satisfying the regulatory
requirements in the Bayh-Dole Act). Note, additionally, that failure to follow these
regulations results in the forfeiture (automatic or otherwise is subject to debate) of the
academic institution’s right to the patented invention, and the rights revert back to the
Federal Government. But see Campbell Plastics Eng’g & Mfg. Inc. v. Brownlee, 389
F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that the government has discretion in
determining whether or not to invoke forfeiture of the patent rights following the failure
to properly follow the regulatory requirements of Bayh-Dole); TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM
Corp., 121 F. Supp. 2d. 349, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Failure to comply with the
conditions of § 202 [Bayh-Dole] results in the Government’s acquiring title.”); Cent.
Admixture Pharmacy Serv. Inc. v. Advanced Cardiac Solutions, P.C., No. CV-00-2430,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95833, at *21–22 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 10, 2006) (criticizing the TM
Patents decision, stating that the forfeiture of rights to a patent is automatic upon failure
to follow the regulatory requirements of Bayh-Dole).
25
See Press Release, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Basic Research Robust in
Face of More University Patenting (Sept. 14, 2007), http://www.eurekalert.org/
pub_releases/2007-09/uow-brr091407.php.
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As a general industry disgust with American academic
technology transfer methods becomes more pervasive, 26 more and
more companies are looking to offshore sources for research and
innovation, in particular to universities that are less protective of
their intellectual property and less likely to involve themselves in
protracted negotiations. 27 To stem this tide and the subsequent
potential loss of foreign graduate students and postdocs to these
foreign universities, flush with cash and technology from foreign
investors, American universities need to reassess and possibly
drastically change their current technology transfer procedures and
mindsets. 28
Meanwhile developing nations ought to take
advantage of this situation, implementing the streamlined transfer
policies suggested in this Article that will benefit the universities,
their researchers, and the licensors who are eagerly looking for
alternatives to the dysfunctional American system.

26

The current stagnation and forecasted decline in industry investment in American
academic research, a decline in academia-industry collaborations, and fewer citations of
academic articles in industry invented patents may be partially attributable to these poor
interactions. See generally Alan I. Rapoport, Where Has the Money Gone? Declining
Industrial Support of Academic R&D, INFOBRIEF: SCI. RESOURCES STATS., Sept. 2006,
available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf06328/nsf06328.pdf.
27
See THOMAS K. GROSE, AM. SOC’Y FOR ENG’G EDUC., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
UNIVERSITIES, CORPORATIONS AND FINDING A COMMON GROUND 3 (2006),
http://www.asee.org/activities/organizations/councils/edc/2006-IP-White-Paper/IPWhite
Paper-WEB.doc (“Frustrated by the hassles endemic in negotiating sponsored research
contracts, many American companies are taking a growing amount of their research work
to foreign academic labs—often in the developing world—where costs are not only low,
but there’s no desire on the part of most schools to own the IP. And, as Wisconsin’s
Dean Peercy says, the companies get excellent results. . . . [A]cross the developing
world, these burgeoning schools are using faculty educated and trained in the United
States, ‘and they are top-notch,’ Peercy says. Taking research to foreign schools is
decidedly a growing trend among many Fortune 500 companies . . . . ‘The levels of
talent and domain expertise are extremely high, and you very often have outright access
to the IP that gets created.’. . . ‘[M]any high-quality foreign universities are very eager to
work with American companies, and by keeping attorneys out of the discussion
completely, they have streamlined the processes.’ . . . [I]t typically takes three weeks to
negotiate a sponsored-research contract with a foreign school, as opposed to the six
months it takes in the United States. . . . [T]hat time savings is a cost savings, too. . . . I
can easily envision a time when we actually encourage our (in-house) researchers’ to
seek overseas research partners. . . . ‘American universities will either have to modify
their behavior or lose their industrial customers.’”).
28
Id. at 25.
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I. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF UNIVERSITY TO INDUSTRY
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
A. The Current State of American Academic Technology Transfer
Although dubbed “[p]ossibly the most inspired piece of
legislation to be enacted in America over the past half-century,” 29
the Bayh-Dole Act 30 does not suffer for lack of detractors. 31
Bayh-Dole, and its potential effects on science, have been
examined, praised, and derided in the months leading up to, and
following, the recent 25th anniversary of its enactment. 32
29

Innovation’s Golden Goose, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 2002, at 3-3. But see Bayhing for
Blood or Doling Out Cash?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 2005, at 50.
30
Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2006).
31
See, e.g., Sara Boettiger & Alan Bennett, Bayh Dole: If We Knew Then What We
Know Now, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 320 (2006) (reviewing the various opinions regarding
Bayh-Dole); see also MICHAEL CRICHTON, NEXT 422–23 (2006) (discussing his
opposition to Bayh-Dole); A Conversation with Michael Crichton: The Charlie Rose
Show (television broadcast Feb. 19, 2007), available at http://www.charlierose.com/
shows/2007/02/19/1/a-conversation-with-michael-crichton (communicating a less
extreme opinion).
32
See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 319, 109th Cong. (2005) (observing a biased view of the
success of the legislation).
[T]he 96th Congress enacted Public Law 96-517, entitled “An Act to
amend the patent and trademark laws” . . . in 1980 . . . before 1980,
only 5 percent of patents owned by the Federal Government were
used by the private sector—a situation that resulted in the American
people being denied the benefits of further development, disclosure,
exploitation, and commercialization of the Government’s patent
portfolio . . . the Bayh-Dole Act established a “single, uniform
national policy designed to . . . encourage private industry to utilize
government financed inventions through the commitment of the risk
capital necessary to develop such inventions to the point of
commercial application”, and eliminated the 26 different Federal
agency policies that had existed regarding the use of the results of
federally funded research and development . . . . Bayh-Dole Act
fundamentally changed the Federal Government’s patent policies by
enabling inventors or their employers to retain patent rights in
inventions developed as part of federally funded research grants,
thereby promoting licensing and the leveraging of contributions by
the private sector towards applied research, and facilitating the
transfer of technology from the laboratory bench to the marketplace .
. . Bayh-Dole . . . ha[s] played a vital role in enabling the United
States to become renowned as the world leader in scientific research,
innovation, ingenuity, and collaborative research that involves
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Anecdotal evidence has suggested, and numerous studies have
attempted to prove, how Bayh-Dole has created the biotechnology
revolution, or distorted the academic mission of American
universities, or has brought incredible untapped wealth through
licensing fees to universities, or has reallocated scarce research
resources away from basic science research, or has turned whitecoated, pure-hearted curious scientists into money-grubbing
corporate shills. 33
institutions of higher education and the private sector . . . [and] has
made substantial contributions to the advancement of scientific and
technological knowledge, fostered dramatic improvements in public
health and safety, strengthened the higher education system in the
United States, served as a catalyst for the development of new
domestic industries that have created tens of thousands of new jobs
for American citizens, strengthened States and local communities
across the country, and benefitted the economic and trade policies of
the United States . . . .
Id. (“[T]he Bayh-Dole Act has stimulated two of the major contemporary scientific trends
of the last quarter century—the development of the biotechnology and information
communications industries—and the Act is poised to continue playing a central role in
new fields of innovative activities, including nanotechnology . . . .”).
33
See, e.g., Wesley Cohen, Patents and Appropriation: Concerns and Evidence, 30 J.
TECH. TRANSFER 57 (2005); Pierre Azoulay et al., The Impact of Academic Patenting on
the Rate, Quality and Direction of (Public) Research Output (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 11917, 2006); Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal
Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An
Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. W11465, 2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=755701; see also Mark A.
Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
611 (2008) (noting that universities sometimes are more focused on maximizing licensing
revenue than on maximizing the overall social impact of technologies). But see D.
Blumenthal, Academic-Industry Relationships in the Life Sciences. Extent, Consequences,
and Management, 268 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3344, 3344 (1992) (noting that the interaction
overall has been good) (“The balance of known benefits and risks suggests that academicindustry relationships should be permitted and even selectively promoted. However,
there is also a need for enhanced vigilance on the part of academic institutions and
government to reduce risks posed by certain types of arrangements. . . .”); David C.
Mowery, Richard R. Nelson, Bhaven N. Sampat, & Arvids A. Ziedonis, The Growth of
Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities: An Assessment of the Effects of the BayhDole Act of 1980, 30 RES. POL’Y 99, 99 (2001) (“The evidence suggests that Bayh-Dole
was only one of several important factors behind the rise of university patenting and
licensing activity. Bayh-Dole also appears to have had little effect on the content of
academic research at these universities. A comparison of these three universities reveals
remarkable similarities in their patent and licensing portfolios 10 years after the passage
of the Bayh-Dole Act.”); James Stuart, Comment, The Academic-Industrial Complex: A
Warning to Universities, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1040–41 (2004).
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The debate is based on the arguably faulty assumptions that
Bayh-Dole has been primarily responsible for the phenomenal
growth in science and technology in the United States during the
past quarter century, and, concurrently, that Bayh-Dole has been
responsible for the growing prioritization-shift among academic
research and a parallel devaluation of academic ideals within the
university. 34 This Article argues that history proves otherwise.
While the encroachment of a proprietary mindset in science,
blamed on Bayh-Dole, has been argued by scholars to be either a
boon or a bust for innovation and advancement, 35 historically,
Bayh-Dole has only been a small player in the introduction of a
patent culture into the science lab. While the commodification of
research and the corporatization of the university may have been
somewhat spurred along by Bayh-Dole, the current state of
American university research programs and U.S. science, in
general, cannot be wholly attributed to the Act. 36

34

See generally Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of
Human Gene Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 1091 (2006) (discussing
some of the effects of commercialization, patenting and licensing on academia).
35
The Economist Technology Quarterly claims that “[m]ore than anything, this single
policy measure helped to reverse America’s precipitous slide into industrial irrelevance.”
Innovation’s Golden Goose, supra note 29; see also Rep. Sensenbrenner Makes
Statement Supporting H. Con. Res. 319, the Bayh-Dole Resolution, AUTM NEWS, March
15, 2006, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20071219033045/http://autm.net/
news/dsp.newsDetails.cfm?nid=81.
The Bayh-Dole Act transformed research and development in
America. The technology boom that daily changes our lives arises
from a combination of basic research, applied research, and
ultimately, the commercialization of innovation. The passage of the
Bayh-Dole Act obliged U.S. universities, hospitals and research
institutions to invest significantly in the process of managing the
intellectual property that emerges from research. The revenues
arising from these commercial and licensing activities are all directed
back into the university community.
Id.
36
See, e.g., David Mowery & Bhaven Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and
University-Industry Technology Transfer: A Model for Other OECD Governments?,
Seminar at The Center on Employment and Economic Growth, Stanford University 18
(May 12, 2004), http://siepr.stanford.edu/programs/SST_Seminars/HBSemulationtalk.pdf
(“[W]e believe that much of the growth in licensing and university-based ‘spinoffs‘ that
has occurred since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act almost certainly would have
occurred in the absence of this piece of legislation . . . . [W]e believe that the Bayh-Dole
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Current research in fact suggests that patenting in academia
(i.e., the goal of Bayh-Dole) does not impede research, alter the
research goals of universities toward more commodifiable research
directions, or promote a veil of secrecy over research. 37
Moreover, independent of the veracity of the above allegations,
the infusement of corporate ideals into scientific research is not the
paradigm shift it is claimed to be. Classical Mertonian ideals, 38
while noble, were merely ideals, 39 the modern science
establishment has long had the anti-Mertonian vices of secrecy, 40

Act was neither necessary nor sufficient for the post-1980 growth in university patenting
and licensing in the United States.”).
37
See generally John P. Walsh & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patents
and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMY 285 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill, eds., 2003).
38
See generally S. Shapin, Mertonian Concessions, 259 SCIENCE 839 (1993)
(providing a short discussion of Mertonian ideals).
39
ROBERT MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (Free Press 1968)
(1949). “The right to search for truth implies also a duty; one must not conceal any part
of what one has recognized to be true.” Einstein Memorial, The Nat’l Acad. of Science
Bldg., http://www.nasonline.org/site/PageServer?pagename=ABOUT_building_einstein_
memorial (last visited Jan. 30, 2009) (quoting inscription on the Albert Einstein
Memorial Statue located on the Academy grounds).
40
Note however, that while secrecy has been a “fact of life in academic science” due
to priority or cost concerns, secrecy is on the rise. Additionally, researchers have found
that a researcher’s association with industry increases her propensity to withhold data. A
decade ago, David Blumenthal and his colleagues found that “[w]ithholding of research
results is not a widespread phenomenon among life-science researchers.” David
Blumenthal, Eric G. Campbell, Melissa S. Anderson, Nancyanne Causino & Karen
Seashore Louis, Withholding Research Results In Academic Life Science—Evidence
From a National Survey of Faculty, 277 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1224 (1997). More recently
they came to a different conclusion: “Data withholding is common, takes multiple forms,
is influenced by a variety of characteristics of investigators and their training, and varies
by field of science.” Blumenthal et al., Data Withholding in Genetics and the Other Life
Sciences: Prevalence and Predictors, 81 ACAD. MED. 137, 137 (2006). See generally Eric
Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics; Evidence from a National
Survey, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 473 (2002). Note, though, that John P. Walsh and Wei
Hong found that while “[s]ecrecy is strongly predicted by scientific competition . . . the
focus on commercialization as the cause may be misplaced.” John P. Walsh & Wei Hong,
Secrecy is Increasing in Step with Competition, 422 NATURE 801, 802 (2003); see also
Arti Rai, Open and Collaborative Research: A New Model for Biomedicine, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES 136 (Robert W. Hahn ed.,
2005), available at http://aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php?
fname=../pdffiles/phpWC.pdf (“Indeed, in the biological sciences, such calls for access
may even create a Mertonian sphere more robust than that which existed before 1980.”).
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rivalry, and inducements outside of noble curiosity and concern for
social welfare. 41
Ironically, the Act may now serve to actually weaken the
alliances between academia and industry. There is an intensified
need by industry for academic basic science research as a source of
new innovation, but, with all the hurdles that Bayh-Dole and the
technology transfer offices enforce, 42 access to basic innovation is
impeded by the technology transfer gatekeepers that protract
negotiations, demand excessive fees and royalties, or write overly
restrictive material transfer agreements. Further, evidence from
Japan indicates that when researchers are faced with complicated
and time consuming hurdles to transfer technology, they will
choose to either transfer the knowledge surreptitiously to a single
corporation without disclosing the knowledge to the industry as a
whole (e.g., through a patent or a publication), or will withhold
disclosure altogether. 43
B. The Technology Transfer Office
If Bayh-Dole is not responsible for either destroying academia
or bolstering the economy, what then has Bayh-Dole accomplished
over the past twenty-five years? If nothing else, Bayh-Dole ought
to be credited with bringing the legal and scientific universes
closer together, although not in the most obvious sense. For
example, scientists, for the most part, continue to ignore
intellectual property rights, 44 infringing with impunity and relying
on an ephemeral research exemption to use proprietary research

41

As this Article’s author has learned through personal experience in academic labs.
The productivity costs resulting from administrating is non-trivial and is thought to
be an important factor in reducing the effectiveness of Japanese researchers, inhibiting
their innovative capacity.
43
See generally Not Invented Here, ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 2007, at 68 (exploring
business in Japan).
44
See generally Kara Moorecroft, Scofflaw Science: Avoiding The Anticommons
Through Ignorance, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 71 (2005).
42

VOL19_BOOK2_GREENBAUM

330

2/26/2009 3:47:32 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 19:311

tools, 45 confident that no right-minded company would sue an
academic establishment. 46
This Article posits that Bayh-Dole does have a true academic
legacy, albeit somewhat more mundane than those suggested by
Congress in their rush to praise the legislation: Bayh-Dole brought
science and the law, two very different worlds, together through
the establishment of the now relatively ubiquitous technology
transfer office. 47
Academic scientists typically lack the market knowledge and
the resources to successfully commercialize their own innovations:
“New firms created [independently by] scientists may lack critical
resources such as technological resources, human capital and
finance [and] typically lack industry experience.” 48 To help the
academe promote and commercialize innovations, universities
have universally invested in the creation of technology transfer
offices or offices of technology licensing (“OTLs”) to help
academics “exploit knowledge-based business ideas” and lower
barriers to commercialization. 49
On paper, technology transfer offices seem like a great idea—
an in-house institution designed and devoted to bridge the science,
law and business goals of the research institution in the
encouragement of technology, information, and knowledge transfer
to promote social welfare and, on the side, provide some revenue
to cash-strapped research departments reeling from recent funding
cuts. Regrettably, the result has been an unexpected culture clash.
Research scientists are often reluctant or, at best, accidental

45

See John R. Thomas, Scientific Research and the Experimental Use Privilege in
Patent Law, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Oct. 28, 2004.
46
Note, however, there are conflicting opinions about the integration of law into
science. See, e.g., STEVEN GOLDBERG, CULTURE CLASH: LAW AND SCIENCE IN AMERICA
104 (1994) (“Doing research today without concern for the ultimate legal consequences is
like doing a high wire act without the wire.”).
47
Note that Bayh-Dole is often credited with bringing together industry and academia,
but these were well on their way to finding each other—it is law and science that truly
make strange and uncomfortable bedfellows.
48
Colm O’Gorman, Orla Byrne & Dipti Pandya, How Scientists Commercialise New
Knowledge Via Entrepreneurship, 33 J. TECH. TRANSFER 23, 24 (2006), available at
http://www.springerlink.com/content/fhm16744j0577243.
49
Id. at 25.
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entrepreneurs, typically only interested in commercializing their
research either to supplement their grant funding or to validate
their research by proving its commerciability. There is a definite
lack of scientists interested in spending the time and effort to
patent and license what will be a wholly university-owned
invention.
Technology transfer offices, on the other hand, are interested in
proving their usefulness to their home institution, preferably by
licensing the next big blockbuster technology. 50 These offices
tend to focus on the distant secondary effect of technology
transfer—revenue generation, at the expense of the primary
purpose—the transfer of knowledge for the benefit of society.
However, technology transfer offices often either just break even
or are outright money-losing ventures for the universities:
[M]any schools earn only enough from IP royalties
to cover the costs of running a technology transfer
office, and a significant number don’t even manage
to do that: They’re in the red. “There is a lot of
mythology out there” concerning royalties, says
Don Giddens, dean of Georgia Insistute of
Technology’s engineering school. And even if a
tech transfer office’s overhead is only just covered
by royalty revenues, “What are the benefits of
that?” asks Nino A. Masnari, dean of the College of
Engineering at North Carolina State University. 51
Nonetheless, this pervasive inability to prioritize between the
secondary and primary goals is not the only reason for the
problems that this Article associates with technology transfer
offices: Bayh-Dole legislation mandates that each university patent
all academic patentable innovation or risk losing the right to patent
that particular innovation. 52
With this overwhelming
responsibility looming over their heads, technology transfer
50
The fact that Nature Biotechnology published a three page piece on getting along
with technology transfer offices is indicative of the poor relationship between technology
transfer offices and scientists. See O. Prem Das, Building Relationships With Technology
Transfer Officers, 23 NATURE BIOTECH. 781 (2005).
51
Grose, supra note 15, at 20.
52
35 U.S.C. § 202(d) (2006).
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officers need to constantly hound and pester researchers for
information relating to anything patentable. 53 This strained
interaction is somewhat understandable: the technology transfer
office may be one of the only sources of interaction between
scientists and law and business interests. Unfortunately, a
quantitative and qualitative assessment of the interaction between
scientists and technology transfer personnel is non-trivial. While a
comparison of technology transfer regulations and material transfer
agreements may be somewhat enlightening, such an analysis
would have to account for differences between regulation and
actual practice in the technology transfer office, as well as those
scientists who avoid technology transfer rules by working around
them. 54
Previous studies focusing on technology transfer offices may
not be as reliable, nor as valuable, as direct conversations with
scientists in determining the extent of the impediments imposed by
technology transfer offices on basic science research. This Article
will later suggest a potential system to measure this interaction and
determine the extent to which research is actually being inhibited.
Through quantifying and qualifying the interactions between
scientists and licensing professionals, Congress, and those
developing nations interested in implementing Bayh-Dole, locally,
may be persuaded to reassess the success of Bayh-Dole and
potentially implement a new and better system. A retrospective
analysis questioning conventional wisdom’s understanding of the
historical role of Bayh-Dole may further help this cause.

53

See David Schwartz, Long-term Tech Transfer Success Depends on Strong TTOResearcher Relationships, TECH. TRANSFER TACTICS, Dec. 10, 2007,
http://www.technologytransfertactics.com/content/2007/12/10/long-term-tech-transfersuccess.
[I]n the daily crush of work most TTOs experience, the focus is on
their invention disclosures, potential partners for their technologies,
legal documents, valuation, market analysis, seed funding . . . . And
in the context of the daily grind, it’s easy to forget that these
researchers are more than the financial value of their ideas—they are
people; individuals, or clients, who must be courted, cajoled,
pampered, communicated with, assisted, and educated.
Id.
54
See Moorecroft, supra note 44.
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II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN
AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES
A. Pre-World War II
Although Bayh-Dole is often credited for spawning the patent
culture
within
American
universities,
patenting
and
commercialization within the Ivory Tower considerably predates
the United States government’s interventions in the early 1980s.
“The phenomenal innovation and job creation that America
produced during the 1990s sprang from significant investments in
education, infrastructure and research and development—that
began in the 1960s,” 55 if not earlier. Arguably, American
academia had been transferring technology and knowhow to the
private sector from its very inception through the publication of
papers, private consulting activities, 56 and presentations at
conferences. 57
The Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890 established the land grant
university system. 58 In 1862, legislation sponsored by
Congressman Justin Morrill of Vermont granted every state in the
Union 30,000 acres of public land for every representative that the
state had in Congress. 59 Over seventy land grant institutions of
55

Editorial, Job Losses: The Wrong Debate; Look to the Future: Preparing American
Workers for the Next Wave is the Key, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 21, 2004, at 4.
56
“The best way to send information is to wrap it up in a person.” J. Robert
Oppenheimer, The Eternal Apprentice, TIME, Nov. 8, 1948, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,853367,00.html.
57
In a 1997 study, the National Science Foundation found that 73% of all papers cited
in industry patents were from academic and public sources. Bruce P. Mehlman, Assistant
Sec’y for Tech. Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Testimony on the Virtues of the BayhDole Act, Opening Statement to the President’s Committee of Advisers on Science and
Technology (May 9, 2002), available at http://patapsco.nist.gov/ts/220/external/tech%
20transfer/testimony%20on%20virtues.htm.
58
The act’s express reasoning was to “promote the liberal and practical education of
the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions in life” through “the
endowment, support, and maintenance of at least one college where the leading object
shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies, and including military
tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and mechanic arts.”
7 U.S.C. § 304 (2006).
59
Thus under the Constitution every state received a minimum of 90,000 acres
because each state has at least three representatives in Congress (two senators and one
congressman). U.S. CONST. art. I., § 2, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
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engineering, agriculture and military science were set up under the
act. The 1890 Act further extended the land grants to the sixteen
southern states. 60
Given the obvious technical nature and
vocational orientation of these land grant universities, there were
powerful incentives within the universities to create close
relationships with industry, 61 and potentially to patent and to
license to industry. 62
In 1912, Frederick Cottrell, a faculty member at the University
of California, Berkeley, established the Research Corporation, 63 in
an effort to manage his, 64 and other’s, 65 scientific patents, and
allocate the surplus income from those patents back into
research. 66
By the 1920s there were already a handful of universities that
were involved in transferring basic science research to industries. 67
Despite the fact that several academics supported patenting
university research, 68 there were many in academia who felt that
60

Backgrounder on the Morrill Act, http://web.archive.org/web/20070824033550rn_1/
usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/27.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
61
DAVID MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION, UNIVERSITYINDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH DOLE ACT 13 (2004).
62
Id. at 39.
63
Cottrell later acknowledged that patenting within public institutions was more
trouble than it was worth. Moreover, he felt that with the exception of a few discoveries,
society would be better off if researchers just published promptly. See Charles Weiner,
Patenting and Academic Research: Historical Case Studies, 12 SCI. TECH. & HUM.
VALUES 55 (1987).
64
For example, his electrostatic precipitator for cleaning smokestack emissions.
Research Corporation for Science Advancement—About RSCA, http://www.rescorp.org/
about-rsca/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
65
The Research Corporation was integral in providing funds for numerous projects
prior to extensive government funding of research after World War Two. These included
the development of the cyclotron by Ernest Lawrence, R.H. Goddard’s experiments with
rockets, and organic synthesis experiments conducted by Robert Burns Woodward. See,
e.g., Chem. Heritage Found.—Chemical Achievers: The Human Face of the Chemical
Sciences,
http://www.chemheritage.org/classroom/chemach/environment/cottrell.html
(last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
66
Research Corporation for Science Advancement, supra note 64.
67
COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: A GUIDE TO THE
LAW
AND
IMPLEMENTING
REGULATIONS
2
(1999),
available
at
http://www.cogr.edu/docs/Bayh_Dole.pdf; see also MOWERY ET AL., supra note 61, at 57
(noting that inter-institutional competition, administrative structure of universities and the
need for more funding helped push universities towards stronger ties with industry).
68
Elihu Thomas, President of MIT, stated in 1920:
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patenting was not the appropriate method to transfer knowledge to
industry or to the public. 69
With uncertainty as to what ought to be the appropriate level of
university patenting, many universities in the early part of the 20th
century set out to devise guidelines for patenting academic
research. Yale University, although formally against patenting,
created policies allowing for some patents to be granted under
specific circumstances. 70 Harvard, in 1934 adopted a similar
policy. 71 Other universities, such as the University of Wisconsin,
I have known some well-meaning scientific men . . . to look askance
at the patenting of inventions, as if it were a rather selfish and
ungracious act, essentially unworthy. The answer is very simple.
Publish an invention freely, and it will almost surely die from lack of
interest in its development. It will not be developed, and the world
will not be benefited. Patent it, and if valuable, it will be taken up
and developed into a business.
Nicholas H. Steneck, Priorities For Federal Innovation Reform Making Ethical Dialogue
a Part of the National Innovation System 1–2 (issue paper submitted to the NSTC
Committee on Technology), available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/media/doc/
steneck2.doc.
69
See, e.g., Weiner, supra note 63, at 50. George and Gladys Dick, at the McCormick
Institute in Chicago developed an antitoxin to Scarlet Fever. After publishing their
results, the market was flooded with antitoxins, many of them substandard. In an effort
to retain quality control, it was suggested that the Dicks patent their antitoxin. The Public
Health Service, citing the patenting of insulin at the University of Toronto, noted that the
ethical barriers to academic patenting were crumbling and suggested that the Dicks also
patent. The Dicks offered to donate their patent to the American Medical Association,
who turned down the offer as there was significant dissention within the AMA as to the
propriety of patenting medical cures. Although the Dicks were nominated for a Nobel
Prize in 1925, the Nobel committee did not award a prize for medicine that year,
reinforcing the criticism that was already rampant in the medical community both
stateside and abroad. Id. at 52–53.
70
Yale AIDS Network, University-Industry Relations: Historical Perspective, Apr. 19,
2003, http://www.yale.edu/aidsnetwork/Spring%202003%20Univ%20IP%20History.ppt.
[I]t is, in general, undesirable and contrary to the best interests of
medicine and the public to patent any discovery or invention
applicable in the fields of public health or medicine; but if, at any
time, any member of the faculty deems it necessary solely for the
protection of the public, without profit to himself or the University, to
control any invention or discovery by means of a patent, he shall
bring the matter before the Prudential Committee.
Id.
71
“No patents primarily concerned with therapeutics or public health may be taken out
by any member of the University, except with the consent of the President and Fellows;
nor will such patents be taken out by the University itself except for dedication to the
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were more aggressive in their patent policies. The Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation (“WARF”), founded by Harry
Steenbock and other alumni of the University of Wisconsin, was
set up in 1925 to manage the licensing of the research coming out
of the University of Wisconsin at Madison. 72 By the 1930s WARF
was so successful that other universities, principally other land
grant institutions, began to emulate it. 73 By the late 1940s most
American universities had developed some sort of patent policy. 74
B. Post War University Research
Following the success of the Manhattan Project, Vannevar
Bush launched the postwar science era with the seminal report
Science-The Endless Frontier. 75 In arguably one of the most
important science pronouncements of the 20th century, Bush called
for, among other things, the establishment of a centralized
government funding source for research, stimulating the formation
of the National Science Foundation (“NSF”) and the National
Institutes of Health (or “NIH”), and establishing the notion of
significant government funding for basic research. 76
Bush
highlighted the importance of basic science research as an impetus
public.” Id. In fact, Harvard, in 1926 refused to patent a medical therapy for anemia,
deciding that it was unethical to patent medical therapies. Id.
72
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation—Steenbock and WARF’s Founding,
http://www.warf.org/about/index.jsp?cid=26&scid=33 (last visited Jan 30, 2009).
73
MOWERY ET AL., supra note 61, at 39–40.
74
Id. at 42. Although in summarizing the history of university patenting prior to the
end of World War II, Weiner notes that in most instances patenting did not pay off and
even when it did, universities also had to deal with credibility issues, general public
disgust, and conflicts of interests arising out of the patents. See Weiner, supra note 63, at
57; see also Bhaven N. Sampat & Richard Nelson, The Emergence and Standardization
of University Technology Transfer Offices: A Case Study of Institutional Change 6–12,
Prepared for the 1999 Conference of the International Society for the New Institutional
Economics
(“ISNIE”),
in
D.C.
(Sept.
16–18,
1999),
http://www.isnie.org/ISNIE99/Papers/nelson.pdf (noting a number of scholars in the ’30s
and ’40s who commented on the trajectory of most universities toward patent polices).
75
VANNEVAR BUSH, SCIENCE THE ENDLESS FRONTIER: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 3
(1945).
76
AAAS made similar pronouncements a decade earlier, stating “that aggressive
governmental support of scientific work is essential to any sound program of building for
the future national welfare.” AAAS RESOLUTION: GOVERNMENT SUPPORT OF SCIENTIFIC
WORK (Dec. 31, 1934), available at http://archives.aaas.org/docs/resolutions.php?
doc_id=199.
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for American innovation and success. 77 Still, Bush cautioned that
much of the success of basic science research was contingent on
the differences between academia and industry, particularly those
positive aspects of academic research that distinguished academia
from industry. 78
The eventual surge in federal funding, particularly in more
recent decades for biomedical research, cemented ties between
basic science researchers and those participating in its clinical
applications. This promoted rapid innovation in the biomedical
fields. 79 With this increased funding, academic research in the
United States dwarfed all other industrialized economies in much
of the postwar period. 80
Prior to 1950, there was no uniform United States government
policy as to the intellectual property status of research produced
via government funds; each agency created and followed their own
guidelines. 81 In 1955, the precursor to the Department of Health

77
“The information, the techniques, and the research experience developed . . . by the
thousands of scientists in the universities and in private industry, should be used in the
days of peace ahead for the improvement of the national health, the creation of new
enterprises bringing new jobs, and the betterment of the national standard of living.”
BUSH, supra note 75, at 3.
78
“It is chiefly in these institutions that scientists may work in an atmosphere which is
relatively free from the adverse pressure of convention, prejudice, or commercial
necessity. . . . Industry is generally inhibited by preconceived goals, by its own clearly
defined standards, and by the constant pressure of commercial necessity. Satisfactory
progress in basic science seldom occurs under conditions prevailing in the normal
industrial laboratory. . . . [I]t is rarely possible to match the universities in respect to the
freedom which is so important to scientific discovery.” Id. at 19.
79
MOWERY ET AL., supra note 61, at 25.
80
Id. at 26.
81
PETER BARTON HUTT & THOMAS MAYS, GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY
COLLABORATION IN AIDS DRUG DEVELOPMENT: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
GOVERNMENT TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER POLICY AND PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 3
(1994), available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=9196&page=3.
Interestingly, government policy towards the patenting of federally funded projects
generally ignored issues relating to universities during this time period (1940s and
1950s), as universities, at this point, were only a fraction of federal research and
development spending. Bhaven N. Sampat, Recent Changes in Patent Policy and the
“Privatization” of Knowledge: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Developing
Countries, in 1 KNOWLEDGE FLOWS, INNOVATION, AND LEARNING IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 39, 54 (2003), available at http://www.cspo.org/home/cspoideas/know_flows/
CSPO_Rockefeller_Vol1.pdf.
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and Human Services, the Health, Education and Welfare
Department (“HEW”), promulgated regulations, noting that in
most circumstances, inventions derived from federally funded
research ought to be made available freely to the public, and, if
patented, should be made available to the public royalty-free and
with non-exclusive licenses. Eventually, in 1968, the NIH granted
universities the right to freely patent and license the innovation. 82
For the most part, these allowances were limited to those
exceptional circumstances where commercial development was
integral to social welfare. In these instances the institution
requesting to license out their research had to request an
Institutional Patent Agreement (or “IPA”) from the Surgeon
General, or, alternatively, petition for title from the granting
agency. 83 These IPAs, (typically few and far between) gave the
research institution the right to determine and define the ownership
of the invention. 84
In 1963, President Kennedy (and later Nixon 85 and Carter 86 as
well, but to lesser degrees) issued a memorandum that attempted to
harmonize the government’s patent policy, creating governmentwide criteria and objectives for the distribution of inventor’s rights

82

The National Science Foundation followed shortly after in 1973. Ken Howard, Tech
Transfer’s Living Legacy, BIOENTREPRENEUR, Oct. 24, 2004, http://www.nature.com/
bioent/2004/041001/full/bioent832.html.
83
Sampat, supra note 81, at 54.
84
HUTT & MAYS, supra note 81, at 4; see also William Broad, Patent Bill Returns
Bright Idea to Inventor, 205 SCIENCE 473, 473 (1979) (noting that scientists often
complained of the ‘bureaucratic knots’ resulting from HEW’s policies and that it was
common for years to “slip by before a funding agency decide[d] whether or not to return
the patent rights to an inventor’s organization”).
85
President Nixon’s 1971 memorandum invoked the Harbridge Report and was later
endorsed by the Bayh-Dole Act. See Lawrence Rudolph, Overview of Federal
Technology Transfer, 5 RISK 133, 134 (1994). “The thrust of [that memo]: ‘A single
presumption of ownership of patent rights to government-sponsored inventions either in
the government or its contractors is not a satisfactory basis for government patent policy
and, that a flexible, government-wide policy best serves the public interest.’” Howard W.
Bremer, The First Two Decades of the Bayh-Dole Act as Public Policy, Presentation to
the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (“NASULGC”),
Nov. 11, 2001, at 6, http://www.lsuhsc.edu/no/administration/otd/Bayh_Dole_Act.pdf.
86
ANDREW Z. MICHAELSON, THE LAW OF THE LAB: USING ZERIT TO INFORM
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 21, 22 (2002), available at http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/
512/michaelson.pdf.
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in government funded research. 87 In spite of these memoranda,
government agencies continued to act independently and
inconsistently. 88 HEW, in particular, refrained from assigning
further IPAs until the General Accounting office reported that
HEW’s policies were deterring industry cooperation with basic
research. 89 In 1968, the executive branch commissioned a report
from Harbridge House which noted that commercial utilization of
government funded research and development was low. 90
Interestingly, the report also found that “the evidence does not
indicate that either title or nonexclusive licensing is uniformly the
best way to promote utilization” of academic research. 91
As the decade progressed, the uncertainty regarding the
government’s views on patenting research and development grew
as well. 92 Nevertheless, even without a coherent government wide
policy, 93 university patenting grew significantly during this period
and into the 1970s. 94 But, without a clear, coherent patent policy
on government-funded research, many in industry were reluctant to
fund research in educational institutions, fearing that a comingling
of even a de minimus amount of federal funds with their private
funds would contaminate the private funds and limit industry’s
ability to claim ownership to commercialize an invention. 95
87

Memorandum of October 10, 1963 [Government Patent Policy], 28 Fed. Reg.
10943, 10944 (Oct. 12, 1963) (following an analysis by Dr. Jerome Weisner, President
Kennedy’s science advisor).
88
HUTT & MAYS, supra note 81, at 4. “Despite numerous congressional hearings on
this issue, no legislation was adopted during the 1950–75 period, because of the inability
of supporters of opposing positions outlined above to resolve their differences.” Sampat,
supra note 81, at 54.
89
HUTT & MAYS, supra note 81, at 4–5.
90
MICHAELSON, supra note 86, at 21.
91
Id.
92
Bob Dole famously stated that “rarely have we witnessed a more hideous example
of overmanagement by the bureaucracy.” BHAVEN N. SAMPAT, PRIVATE PARTS: PATENTS
AND PUBLIC RESEARCH IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 17 (2003), available at
http://www.card.iastate.edu/research/stp/papers/SAMPAT-Nov-03.pdf.
93
Rudolph, supra note 85.
94
MOWERY ET AL., supra note 61, at 50, 57 (noting that federal fund dispersion
increased negotiations of IPAs, changing content of research, and noting a greater trend
by federal agencies towards allowing institutions to patent).
95
See, e.g., Bayh-Dole: The Next 25 Years: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Science and
Technology, Subcomm. on Technology and Innovation, 110th Cong. (2007). These
concerns were somewhat lessened by Bayh-Dole where the government’s retained rights
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C. Bayh-Dole
In September of 1978, Senators Dole and Bayh introduced
Senate Bill 414, the University and Small Business Patent Act,
which attempted to harmonize the government’s policies towards
patenting of federally funded research, changing the presumption
as to who ought to own a patent resulting from academic
research. 96 Interestingly, while much of the rhetoric surrounding
the bill focused on losing the innovative edge to Japan and other
foreign countries, 97 there was no mention of the idea within the bill
itself. 98
On July 1, 1980, a lame duck Congress, against all odds,
passed the Bayh-Dole Act. 99 The legislation gave universities and
small businesses (and later by executive order, large businesses 100 )
the ability to maintain title to their federally sponsored
innovations, 101 if a number of regulations are adhered to. 102 These
in the patent are limited to instances where the funds were used in either the conception
of the invention or in the first actual reduction to practice. See John H. Raubitschek,
Responsibilities Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 311, 313
(2005).
96
See, e.g., David C. Mowery, The Bayh-Dole Act and High-Technology
Entrepreneurship in U.S. Universities: Chicken, Egg, or Something Else?, Presented at
the Colloquium on Entrepreneurship Education and Technology Transfer 11 (Jan. 21–22,
2005),
available
at
http://entrepreneurship.eller.arizona.edu/docs/conferences/
2005/colloquium/D_Mowery.pdf. Note also that prior to Bayh-Dole there were 20
statutes governing the United States policy towards patents. See, e.g., Clifton Leaf, The
Law of Unintended Consequences, FORTUNE, Sept. 19, 2005, at 250.
97
See, e.g., Broad, supra note 84, at 476.
98
MICHAELSON, supra note 86, at 24.
99
See, e.g., Ashley Stevens, The Enactment of Bayh-Dole, 29 J. TECH. TRANSFER 93
(2004) (a compelling narrative of the events immediately preceding the passage of BayhDole).
100
See Exec. Order No. 12,591, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,414 (Apr. 10, 1987).
101
“Bayh-Dole clearly and decisively answered the question whether academic
researchers can own and commercialize government-sponsored research. According to
Bayh-Dole, they not only can but are also obligated to do so.” Steneck, supra note 68,
at 3.
102
Note however that these requirements have changed a couple of times over the
years. See generally Raubitschek, supra note 95, at 311. In exchange for title, receivers
of federal funds can claim title to the invention if they: (1) report each disclosed
invention to the funding agency, (2) elect to retain title in writing within a statutorily
prescribed timeframe, (3) file for patent protection, (4) grant the federal government a
non-exclusive, non-transferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have practiced
on its behalf throughout the world, (5) actively promote and attempt to commercialize the
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included: (i) the university must “disclose each subject invention
to the Federal agency within a reasonable time (i.e., two
months) 103 after it becomes known to contractor personnel
responsible for the administration of patent matters;” 104 (ii) once
disclosed the university must opt in to retain title and patenting
rights to the invention within two years; 105 (iii) the government
“shall have a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up
license to practice or have practiced for or on behalf of the United
States any subject invention throughout the world;” 106 (iv) the
government also retains the right “to require periodic reporting on
the utilization or efforts at obtaining utilization that are being made
by the contractor or his licensees or assignees;” 107 (v) the
government can require that the patenting university “include
within the specification of such application and any patent issuing
thereon, a statement specifying that the invention was made with
Government support and that the Government has certain rights in
the invention;” 108 (vi) the government also granted itself ‘march in
rights’ 109 that is, a grant of either “a nonexclusive, partially
invention, (6) do not assign the rights to the technology, with a few exceptions, (7) share
royalties with the inventor, (8) use any remaining income for education and research, (9)
give preference to U.S. industry and small business. 35 U.S.C §§ 200–212 (2006). While
typically lax in enforcing these requirements, the government has on at least one occasion
refused to grant title when disclosure was not timely and piecemeal. See Campbell
Plastics Eng’g & Mfg., Inc. v. Brownlee, 389 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding
that while policy considerations behind the Bayh-Dole Act “clearly intended ‘to promote
the commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the United States by
United States industry and labor,’ and ‘to encourage maximum participation of small
business firms in federally supported research and development efforts,’ [Congress] also
provided the government with certain aforementioned rights to the inventions and sought
to ensure the safeguard of those rights by requiring government contractors to disclose
subject inventions.” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000)).
103
See, e.g., Cent. Admixture Pharmacy Serv., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiac Solutions,
P.C., No. CV-00-2430, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95833, at *16 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 10, 2006)
(citing 48 C.F.R. § 52.227-11(c)(1) (2007)).
104
35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1) (2006).
105
Or sixty days prior to the expiration of the one year grace period granted to
inventions that have been publicized, e.g., through a scholarly publication or conference.
35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(2) (2006).
106
Id. § 202(c)(4).
107
Id. § 202(c)(5).
108
Id. § 202(c)(6).
109
Note, however, that march-in rights have been part of the government’s university
patenting policy since the 1960s. See Raubitschek, supra note 95, at 312.
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exclusive, or exclusive license in any field of use to a responsible
applicant or applicants, upon terms that are reasonable under the
circumstances;” 110 (vii) universities cannot transfer ownership of a
patented innovation developed in whole or in part with university
funds to a third party; and (viii) all exclusive licensees must
substantially manufacture the commercialized product in the
United States.
Although there is some flexibility in these regulations, 111
failure to conform could result in the forfeiture of the intellectual
property rights to the invention, even if the government was in no
way harmed. 112 Additionally, failure to comply limits the ability
of the patent owner to enforce her patent against putative
infringers. 113
Bayh-Dole provisions apply only to inventions conceived or
first introduced into practice as a result of a project funded either in
whole or in part by the federal government. 114 When this is the
case, Bayh-Dole gives the named inventor the right to acquire the
patent rights to her invention in the relatively unlikely event that
the contractor, i.e., the academic institution, does not elect to retain
its title, and provided that the federal funding agency has consulted

110

35 U.S.C. § 203(1). The application of these rights are thoroughly noted in the
Federal Register, Rights To Inventions Made By Nonprofit Organizations And Small
Business Firms Under Government Grants, Contracts, And Cooperative Agreements, 37
C.F.R. § 401.6 (2006). Note that the idea of march-in rights dates back to at least
Vanaver Bush, who thought that “[t]he public interest will normally be adequately
protected if the Government receives a royalty-free license for governmental purposes
under any patents resulting from work financed by the [National Science] Foundation.”
See BUSH, supra note 75, at 38.
111
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(2) (2006) (allowing for the contractor to request
additional time from the funding source to complete the regulatory requirements).
112
“[N]oncompliance with a patent rights clause may have serious consequences on
enforcing rights in any invention made with Government funding. Although I doubt that
agencies will start exercising forfeiture rights, I expect that contractors and universities,
in particular, will be more careful in meeting their obligations under Bayh-Dole.”
Raubitschek, supra note 95, at 318; see, e.g., Campbell Plastics Eng’g & Mfg. v.
Brownlee, 389 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2004). But see Narda Microwave v. Gen.
Microwave Corp., 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 231, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (allowing the
contractor to rectify its oversight).
113
See Filmtec Corp. v. Allied Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991); TM Patents
L.P. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
114
Raubitschek, supra note 95, at 313.
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with the contracting academic institution at the request of the
inventor and prior to granting the rights to the inventor. 115
Bayh-Dole had numerous policy objectives in addition to
simply promoting innovation resulting from federally funded
research. Bayh-Dole legislation encourages the participation of
small businesses in federally funded research and promotes
collaboration between commercial and non-profit organizations,
not just universities.
President Jimmy Carter, in his signing statement on Bayh-Dole
anticipated that the legislation would provide “some real benefits
to the Nation's economic health by stimulating our people's
innovative activity.” 116 Although one cannot know for sure if
Bayh-Dole provided any immediate stimulation to innovation, we
can look to concurrent scientific advancements to see that
biotechnology, in particular, was already well on its way to its
1980s era boom, even without Bayh-Dole.
D. Concurrent Events in Science
Much of academic patenting and licensing is in the area of life
sciences. In order to assess the actual impact of Bayh-Dole on
universities, it is important to put the legislative act within the
historical context of the science at the time. Molecular biology
was going through its own paradigm shift concurrent with the
events leading up to and following the passage of Bayh-Dole. 117
Modern understanding of molecular biology usually begins in
1953 with the discovery of the structure of DNA. 118 Watson and
115

35 U.S.C. § 202(d).
President James E. Carter, Patent and Trademark System Reform Statement on
Signing
H.R.
6933
Into
Law
(Dec.
12,
1980),
available
at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=44398.
117
Eric Campbell calls the convergence of Bayh-Dole, molecular biology, and other
events in this time period the “science and technology version of the Perfect Storm.” See
Alan Dove, When Science Rides the MTA, 110 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 425, 425
(2002).
118
J.D. Watson & F.H.C. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids, 171 NATURE
738 (1953). Note, however, that there were numerous other earlier discoveries that led to
many of the techniques commonly used today in biotechnology. See, e.g., J. Lederberg &
E.L. Tatum, Gene Recombination in Escherichia Coli, 158 NATURE 558 (1946)
(describing transfer of bacterial genes); S.E. Luria et al., Electron Microscope Studies of
116
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Crick’s determination of the double stranded helical structure of
DNA 119 led to an understanding of how DNA replicates and serves
as a template for the production of all the proteins in the cell. In
the early 1970s much of the Nobel Prize winning technology and
knowledge that would be integral to the coming biotechnology
revolution began to be discovered by academic research labs in
quick succession. This massive expansion of our understanding of
the basic molecular nature of the cell helped create the
biotechnology revolution. Further, with many of these scientists in
academia, this helped propel universities—now owners of these
blockbuster innovations—into prosperous relationships with
industry.
The seventies began with the discovery of retroviruses by
Nobel Laureates Drs. Temin and Baltimore in 1970. 120 In 1972,
Paul Berg determined how to isolate genes from one organism and
recombine them with DNA from a different organism in vivo. 121
In 1973, Cohen and Boyer created functional organisms that were
able to recombine DNA from other cells and replicate that DNA as
their own. 122 Drs. Hedges and Jacob discovered transposons in
bacterial genomes in 1974, transferring amipicillin resistance from
one plasmid to another. 123 In 1975, Edward Southern created the

Bacterial Viruses, 46 J. BACTERIOLOGY 57 (1943) (describing the mechanism of viral
infection); Arne Tiselius, A New Apparatus for Electrophoretic Analysis of Colloidal
Mixtures, 33 TRANSACTIONS OF THE FARADAY SOC’Y 524 (1937) (describing the
technique of electrophoresis).
119
Watson & Crick, supra note 118.
120
D. Baltimore, RNA-Dependent DNA PolymeraseIin virions of RNA Tumour Viruses,
226 NATURE 1209 (1970); H.M. Temin & S. Mizutani, RNA-Dependent DNA Polymerase
in Virions of Rous Sarcoma Virus 226 NATURE 1211 (1970).
121
J.F. Morrow & P. Berg, Cleavage of Simian Virus 40 DNA at a Unique Site by a
Bacterial Restriction Enzyme, 69 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 3365 (1972).
122
S.N. Cohen et al., Construction of Biologically Functional Bacterial Plasmids in
Vitro, 70 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 3240, 3240 (1973). The famed Cohen-Boyer
discovery brought in over 200 million dollars in royalties, with the bulk going to the
University of California, San Fransisco and Stanford Universities. Interestingly, the
inventors themselves plowed their third of the revenue back into research, declining to
take any of the money for their personal use. See Baruch Brody, Intellectual Property and
Biotechnology: The US Internal Experience—Part I, 16 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 1.6, 6
(2006).
123
R.W. Hedges & A.E. Jacob, Transposition of Ampicillin Resistance from RP4 to
Other Replicons, 132 MOLECULAR GEN. GENETICS 31 (1974).
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Southern Blot, the precursor of today’s high throughput genomic
chips and other technologies. 124 Kohler and Milstein created the
first monoclonal antibodies in 1975. 125 Harold Varmus and J.
Michael Bishop later received the Nobel Prize for their discovery
of the cellular origin of retroviral oncogenes in 1976. 126 In 1977,
Maxam and Gilbert,127 concurrently with Sanger in the U.K., 128
developed modern methods for sequencing strands of DNA—a
necessary innovation for the eventual decoding of the entire human
genome, as well as other genomes, 129 and Itakura et al. first
synthesized a human protein by bacterial transformation. 130 In
1980, the first transgenic mouse was created. 131 In 1986, the
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) methodology was introduced by
Kary Mullis. 132
Note that this list of important biotechnology inventions is
merely illustrative, and is far from an exhaustive list, of all the
major accomplishments that occurred during the period leading up
to and directly following the enactment of Bayh-Dole, in 1980.
Science in general was experiencing a phenomenal and
unprecedented growth spurt during this period: during the ’70s
there was, on average an annual 2% increase in the number of
124
E.M. Southern, Detection of Specific Sequences Among DNA Fragments Separated
by Gel Electrophoresis, 98 J. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 503 (1975).
125
G. Kohler & C. Milstein, Continuous Cultures of Fused Cells Secreting Antibody of
Predefined Specificity, 256 NATURE 495 (1975).
126
D. Stehelin et al., DNA Related to the Transforming Gene(s) of Avian Sarcoma
Viruses is Present in Normal Avian DNA, 260 NATURE 170 (1976).
127
Allan M. Maxam & Walter Gilbert, A New Method for Sequencing DNA, 74 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 560 (1977).
128
Frederick Sanger et al., DNA Sequencing with Chain-Terminating Inhibitors, 74
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 5463 (1977).
129
Maxam, supra note 127, at 561.
130
Keiichi Itakura et al., Expression in Escherichia Coli of a Chemically Synthesized
Gene for the Hormone Somatostatin, 198 SCIENCE 1056 (1977).
131
Jon W. Gordon et al., Genetic Transformation of Mouse Embryos by Microinjection
of Purified DNA, 77 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 738 (1980).
132
K. Mullis, et al., Specific Amplification of DNA In Vitro: The Polymerase Chain
Reaction, 51 COLD SPRING HARBOR SYMP. ON QUANTITATIVE BIOLOGY 263 (1986). Dr.
Mullis was awarded the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for this discovery. Press Release,
Royal Swedish Acad. of Sci., The 1993 Nobel Prize in Chemistry (Oct. 13, 1993),
available
at
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/1993/press.html
(“With PCR it is possible to replicate several million times, in a test tube, an individual
DNA segment of a complicated genetic material.”).
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scientific publications. 133 Starting in the late 1970s and continuing
on through the ’80s science saw a jump to an annual increase of 4
or 5% in the publication of papers. 134 By 1990 biomedical science
was pumping out 85% more papers annually than it had produced
in 1970. 135
With much of the basic technology of the
biotechnology revolution produced, published, and freely available
long before Bayh-Dole passed, it seems difficult to ascribe even a
large part of the current biotechnology boom to Bayh-Dole.
E. Concurrent Biotechnology Industry Growth
Wall Street was also very interested in biotechnology at this
time, with equity investments in biotechnology companies
increasing from $50 million to over $800 million between 1978
and 1981. 136 Genentech, which preceded Bayh-Dole, exemplified
Wall Street’s early passion for biotech. Long before the dawn of
huge IPOs, the value of Genentech stock, a pioneer biotechnology
company founded by University of California, San Fransisco
professors Herbert Boyer and Robert Swanson, went from $35
million to $89 million in the first 20 minutes of public trading. 137
Cetus (founded in Berkeley, California in 1971) successfully went
public around the same time. 138 Cetus’s initial public offering
pulled in over 100 million dollars, making it the largest IPO on the
American stock market at the time. 139
133

Data compiled by the author from PubMed, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/.
Id.
135
Id.
136
Biotech Stock Letter—Investors History of the Biotech Industry, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20070202171703/http://biotechstock.com/en-us/pg_10.html
(as the page appeared on Feb. 2, 2007).
137
Brody, supra note 122, at 7.
138
Id. at 8–9.
139
Michael Rosen, The Birth of Biotech: San Francisco, Boston, Geneva or Chicago?,
WIS. TECH. NETWORK NEWS, Aug. 25, 2004, http://wistechnology.com/article.php?
id=1118. In October of 1979, Business Week was already gushing about the future of
biotechnology in industry:
As recently as three years ago, predictions of a future technology
based on bacteria sounded at best like science fiction . . . .
[E]xcitement over industrial applications is building rapidly . . . .
[T]he promise is nothing less than “the possibility of building a
sustainable future based on renewable resources” . . . . In the area of
synthetic organic chemicals alone, J. Leslie Glick, president of Genex
134
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By 1987, the San Francisco Bay Area’s biotech industry,
benefiting from the quality and quantity of surrounding
universities, a local agricultural biotechnology sector, and
favorable non-compete laws that promoted cross-fertilization
among companies, had grown to 112 companies, from 84 a decade
earlier. 140 These companies had revenues exceeding 2 billion
dollars and created at least 19,400 San Francisco Bay Area jobs.
The market only got hotter as the decade wound down, with 81
new companies being formed in the Bay Area between 1987–
1990. 141 Although exemplified in the Bay Area, innovation and
productivity were also up nationwide, setting the stage for a
competitive and robust biotechnology industry that would feed off
of academic research. 142
F. Concurrent Events in Patent Law
In addition to the incredible advancements made in molecular
biology, Bayh-Dole was enacted just as important changes in the
United States patent regime—vis-à-vis the biotechnology
industry—were taking effect. Throughout the 1970s, patent
eligibility requirements were confusing and contradictory, 143 and

Corp., has identified existing markets worth $12.4 billion annually in
which he is convinced that bacteria have a high probability of being
more efficient and economical than present technology. . . . And
Glick sees another group of markets worth $20 billion annually
where less substantial inroads are possible, including the manufacture
of such products as plastics, synthetic rubber, and pesticides. Seeing
the potential, a growing number of industrial companies are buying in
to gain what Charles L. Ruby, Corporate planning manager at
Standard Oil Co. of California (Socal), calls “a window on this
technology.”
Where Genetic Engineering Will Change Industry, BUS. WEEK, Oct. 22, 1979, at 160.
140
BayBio—History of the Industry, http://www.baybio.org/wt/home/Industry_
Statistics (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
141
Id.
142
See, e.g., Stephen A. Merrill, Executive Dir. Sci., Tech., & Econ. Policy Bd., The
Nat’l Acads., Remarks at the Conference on IPR, Innovation, and Economic Performance
(Aug. 28, 2003). For slides of the presentation see http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/51/
12040024.pdf.
143
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Biotech Patents: Looking Backward While Moving Forward,
24 NATURE BIOTECH. 317, 317 (2006).

VOL19_BOOK2_GREENBAUM

348

2/26/2009 3:47:32 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 19:311

standards for utility, novelty, non-obviousness, and written
description were in flux. 144
In 1980, the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 145 solidified the expanded scope of patentable
subject matter, proclaiming that the patent act will protect
“anything under the sun that is made by man” including living
organisms and other biological matter. 146 This decision gave
biotechnology firms and research institutions the opportunity to
patent their biotechnology discoveries.
Diamond v. Diehr 147 set the stage for the patenting of
computer software, an integral component of the growing fields of
bioinformatics and computational biology, and necessary for the
high throughput analysis revolution. In 1990, the California
Supreme Court in Moore v. Regents of the University of
California 148 ruled that the cell line derived from an unwitting
patient could be patented, with the patient himself having no claim
to those derived cells. 149 “[T]he use of excised human cells in
medical research does not amount to a conversion.” 150
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (or “USPTO”), in an
interference decision, explicitly expanded the scope of
patentability to include plants, 151 and later more complex
144

See generally id.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (ruling that a genetically engineered
bacteria that consumed oil could be patented).
146
Id. at 309.
147
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
148
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
149
Id. at 492–93.
Human cell lines are patentable because long-term adaptation and
growth of human tissues and cells in culture is difficult—often
considered an art . . . . It is this inventive effort that patent law
rewards, not the discovery of naturally occurring raw materials.
Thus, Moore’s allegations that he owns the cell line and the products
derived from it are inconsistent with the patent, which constitutes an
authoritative determination that the cell line is the product of
invention.
Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotes omitted).
150
Id. at 493. “Moore’s allegations that he owns the cell line and the products derived
from it are inconsistent with the patent, which constitutes an authoritative determination
that the cell line is the product of the invention.” Id.
151
Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, 444 (1985).
145
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organisms 152 —eventually even issuing a patent for a transgenic
mouse. 153 During this time the Patent Office announced that it
considered all “non-naturally occurring non-human multicellular
living organisms, including animals, to be patentable subject
matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. [§] 101.” 154 There were large
institutional changes as well: The Federal Circuit, which is largely
perceived as pro-patent 155 and has been actively involved in
shaping patent policy to support the biotechnology industry, was
established in 1982. 156 The Hatch Waxman Act of 1984 157
allowed pharmaceutical patentees to hold onto their patent
monopoly a little longer, making up for time lost during the FDA
approval process, further promoting the biotechnology industry. 158
G. Concurrent Legislative Efforts
Even if one were to ascribe a significant portion of the
responsibility for the biotechnological and high tech revolutions to
Bayh-Dole, the act was only one piece of a larger set of relatively
concurrent legislative acts that attempted to promote the transfer of
technology. Each of the other pieces of legislation focused on a
particular niche, but together they helped set the stage for the
biotechnological boom.
152

Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425, 1427 (1987) (allowing the patenting of
polyploid oysters).
153
Transgenic Non-Human Mammals, U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22, 1984)
(issued Apr. 12, 1988).
154
Brody, supra note 122, at 14.
155
See Cohen, supra note 33, at 58 (discussing perception of CAFC granting large
awards); Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit’s Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUDS. 85, 114 (2006) (noting that
“[i]n sum, we find that the CAFC has been pro-patent, but only with respect to
validity.”). But see John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote
in Patent Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, 767 (2000) (“[T]he outcome of
patent validity cases in the Federal Circuit has depended on the facts of the case, and not
on the composition of the panel.”).
156
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—About the Court,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/about.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
157
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98. Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b–68c, 70b, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301, 355, 360cc, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282).
158
See generally Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its
Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187 (1999) (providing a
history and the effects of the act).
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In 1976, President Ford, in an effort to revive the presidential
science advisory system (“PSAC”), signed the National Science
and Technology Policy Organization and Priorities Act of 1976 159
which established an executive office of Science and Technology
Policy (or “OSTP”). The act gave the OSTP a
broad mandate to advise the President and others
within the Executive Office of the President on the
effects of science and technology on domestic and
international affairs . . . [and] authorizes OSTP to
lead an interagency effort to develop and to
implement sound science and technology policies
and budgets and to work with the private sector,
state and local governments, the science and higher
education communities, and other nations toward
this end. 160
The OSTP has had a significant influence on national innovation
policies. During the Carter presidency, the OSTP worked to
influence the president to stimulate or remove barriers to
innovation, promoted close industry-university relations, and
created a close working relationship with the Office of
Management and Budget effectuating a pro-science policy. 161
In 1978 the National Science Foundation started a pilot project
to promote university-industry cooperation—something that had
159

National Science and Technology Policy Organization and Priorities Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-282, 90 Stat. 549 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6614(a)(2),
6615, 6618). The law stipulated that the U.S. government
adhere to a national policy for science and technology which includes
the following principles: (1) the continuing development and
implementation of a national strategy for determining and achieving
the appropriate scope, level, direction, and extent of scientific and
technological efforts . . . (2) the enlistment of science and technology
to foster a healthy economy in which the directions of growth and
innovation are compatible with the prudent and frugal use of
resources . . . and (3) the development and maintenance of a solid
base for science and technology in the United States.
Id. at § 102.
160
Office of Science & Technology Policy—About OSTP, http://www.ostp.gov/cs/
about_ostp (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
161
See Frank Press, Science and Technology in the White House, 1977 to 1980: Part 1,
211 SCIENCE 139, 142 (1980).
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been on the decline since the exponential growth of government
research funds in the 1950s. 162
In 1980 Congress passed the Stevenson-Wydler Technology
Innovation Act 163 which promoted the patenting and licensing of
federal laboratory research and development.
Like later
technology transfer offices set up in universities in response to
Bayh-Dole, Stevenson-Wydler required that federal labs set up
Offices of Research and Technology Applications and set aside a
portion of their funding for the explicit goal of transferring
technology to the private sector. 164
The act also established the National Medal of Technology,165
an honor “given annually to individuals, teams, and/or
companies/divisions for their outstanding contributions to the
Nation’s economic, environmental and social well-being through
the development and commercialization of technology products,
processes and concepts, technological innovation, and
development of the Nation’s technological manpower.” 166 “By
highlighting the national importance of technological innovation,
the Medal also seeks to inspire future generations of Americans to
prepare for and pursue technical careers to keep America at the
forefront of global technology and economic leadership.” 167
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 168 allowed universities that had
financed the construction of their facilities with tax exempt bonds
to conduct industry-sponsored research in those facilities without

162

See generally Richard C. Atkinson & William A. Blanpied, Research Universities:
Core of the US Science and Technology System, 30 TECH. IN SOC’Y 30 (2008).
163
Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat.
2311 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701–14) (“[T]he Federal Government shall
strive where appropriate to transfer federally owned or originated technology to State and
local governments and to the private sector.”).
164
15 U.S.C. § 3719 (2006).
165
Id. § 3711. Note, however, that the first medal was not awarded until 1985. See U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office—The National Medal of Technology and Innovation,
http://www.uspto.gov/nmti (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
166
National Medal of Technology and Innovation Nomination Application, 73 Fed.
Reg. 57337 (Oct. 2, 2008).
167
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office—The National Medal of Technology and
Innovation, http://www.uspto.gov/nmti (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
168
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
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losing their tax exempt status. 169 In order to retain this status, the
resulting research had to fall within one of two safe harbors for
basic research activities; 170 either a corporate-sponsored research
agreement—which required that the sponsor pay a fair market
price for the intellectual property rights in the resulting research, or
a joint industry governmental cooperative research agreement—
which required that the “[t]itle to any patent or other product
incidentally resulting from the basic research lies exclusively with
the university and that the cooperating corporations would be
entitled to no more than a nonexclusive, royalty-free license to use
the product of any of that research.” 171
The Orphan Drug Act, 172 with a particular focus on rare
diseases, passed in 1983.
This act was designed to provide
incentives for drug companies to invest in research and
development, 173 focusing primarily on classes of unprofitable
169

IRS Rev. Proc. 97-14, 1997-5 I.R.B. 20 (IRB 1997). This was superseded only
recently on June 26, 2007 by Revenue Procedure 2007-47 that clarifies exactly how
Bayh-Dole rights fit within the safe harbor parameters. See, e.g., Mintz-Levin, Public
Finance Advisory: IRS Clarifies Sponsored Research Limitations, July 13, 2007,
http://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2007/Pub-Fin-Adv-Sponsored-Research-0707/index.htm.
170
Mintz-Levin, Public Finance Advisory: IRS Clarifies Sponsored Research
Limitations, July 13, 2007, http://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2007/Pub-Fin-AdvSponsored-Research-07-07/index.htm.
171
Id.
172
Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (defining “rare” as any
disease or condition which (A) affects less than 200,000 persons in the United States, or
(B) affects more than 200,000 in the United States and for which there is no reasonable
expectation that the cost of developing and making available in the United States a drug
for such disease or condition will be recovered from sales in the United States of such
drug).
173
Orphan Drug Act, § 1(b)(4)–(6), 96 Stat. at 2049.
[B]ecause so few individuals are affected by any one rare disease or
condition, a pharmaceutical company which develops an orphan drug
may reasonably expect the drug to generate relatively small sales in
comparison to the cost of developing the drug and consequently to
incur a financial loss; . . . [Thus] there is reason to believe that some
promising orphan drugs will not be developed unless changes are
made in the applicable Federal laws to reduce the costs of developing
such drugs and to provide financial incentives to develop such drugs .
. . [and] it is in the public interest to provide such changes and
incentives for the development of orphan drugs.
Id.
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drugs. 174 The Act has helped build biotechnological science,
create large and small pharmaceutical firms, and promote the type
of research that might be conducted in an academic setting—
research on niche diseases with little prospect of financial
payback. 175
The Federal Technology Transfer Act 176 was enacted in
1986 to amend Stevenson Wydler. This act attempted to
institutionalize technology transfer in government laboratories by,
among other things, making technology transfer a component of
employee evaluation. To further promote technology transfer, the
Act chartered the Federal Laboratory Consortium (or “FLC”) to
actively “promote and strengthen technology transfer
nationwide.” 177
Other legislation contributing to the technological boom
include: the Small Business Innovation Development Act of
1982, 178 Cooperative Research Act of 1984, 179 Trademark
Clarification Act of 1984, 180 Japanese Technical Literature Act of
174

By most accounts the Orphan Drug Act has been a success. See 21 U.S.C. § 360ee
note (a)(5) (2006) (“Before 1983, some 38 orphan drugs had been developed. Since the
enactment of the Orphan Drug Act [Jan. 4, 1983], more than 220 new orphan drugs have
been approved and marketed in the United States and more than 800 additional drugs are
in the research pipeline.”).
175
See, e.g., Steve Seget, Orphans Join European Pharma Family, PHARMAFOCUS.COM,
July 5, 2005, http://www.pharmafocus.com/cda/focusH/1,2109,22-0-0-JUL_2005focus_feature_detail-0-353040,00.html (“Orphan drug legislation in the US is often cited
as a major factor in the biotech boom of the 1980s.”); see also Beverly Goodman, The
Biotech Boom: Big Money in Orphans, RED HERRING, July 27, 2001,
http://www.redherring.com/Home/1396.
176
Federal Technology Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785 (1986).
177
Federal
Laboratory
Consortium
for
Technology
Transfer,
http://www.federallabs.org/home/about (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). Over 250 federal
laboratories and centers and their parent departments and agencies are members of the
FLC. See id.
178
Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 638 (2006) (“It is
the policy of the Congress that assistance be given to small-business concerns to enable
them to undertake and to obtain the benefits of research and development in order to
maintain and strengthen the competitive free enterprise system and the national
economy.”).
179
Cooperative Research Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. § 69 (2006) (establishing that
cooperative research is not a per se antitrust violation).
180
Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (2006) (amending the
Lanham Trademark Act).
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1986, 181 the Executive Order Facilitating Access to Science and
Technology, 182 and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988. 183
III. EFFECTS OF A CULTURAL SHIFT TOWARDS TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER
A. Revisiting the Technology Transfer Office
While the previous section noted numerous other forces at
work that drove universities to their current patent culture and
helped to promote the current U.S. technology industry successes,
the significant consequence of the Bayh-Dole Act arguably has
been primarily the expansion of technology transfer offices into
hundreds of universities. 184
The Association of University
181

Japanese Technical Literature Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. § 3704 (2006); see Ronald
Reagan, Statement on Signing the Japanese Technical Literature Act of 1986 (Aug. 14.
1986), http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/081486f.htm (explaining
that the Act will “increase the availability in the United States of scientific and technical
literature published in the Japanese language”).
182
Exec. Order No. 12,591, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,414 (Apr. 10, 1987) (promoting
technology transfer by establishing the Technology Share Program whereby “scientists
and engineers in the private sector may take temporary assignments in Federal
laboratories, and scientists and engineers in Federal laboratories may take temporary
assignments in the private sector”).
183
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107.
184
See, e.g., National Institutes of Health: Moving Research from the Bench to Bedside:
Health Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Health of the H.Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 60
(2003) (statement of Jonathan Soderstrom, Managing Director, Office of Cooperative
Research, Yale University, noting that Yale set up its licensing office as a direct response
to Bayh-Dole); see also COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 67 (“With
the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, colleges and universities immediately began to
develop and strengthen the internal expertise needed to effectively engage in the
patenting and licensing of inventions. In many cases, institutions that had not been active
in this area began to establish entirely new technology transfer offices, building teams
with legal, business, and scientific backgrounds. These activities continue to accelerate
nationally as the importance of the Bayh-Dole Act becomes fully appreciated.”). But see
Sampat & Nelson, supra note 74, at 20 (noting that the inability of the Research
Corporation to handle all of the licenses may have been an impetus to set up technology
transfer offices and citing a 1974 Research Corporation report that found that every major
institution was considering setting up a technology transfer office); id. at 20, 31 (noting
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Technology Managers (or “AUTM”) lists over 700 university and
research institute technology transfer offices in the United
States. 185
During the last decade (between 1990 and 2000), invention
disclosures to these technology transfer offices have increased by
79%, patent applications by 253%, 186 patents granted by 131%,
and start-up companies evolving out of university research by
92%.
While many of these offices share similar goals and
responsibilities, 187 differences remain regarding the extent of their
involvement in non-licensing related activities. 188 In general, the
offices are responsible for patenting university-created inventions,
licensing faculty innovation, and helping faculty license in outside
technology. Many offices work with faculty to identify, evaluate,
and determine commercial potential for patentable faculty
inventions. The offices also work to promote a patent-friendly
culture among the faculty, foster contractual and business
relationships between faculty and industry, and mediate complex
negotiations between faculty, other academic institutions, and
industry.

that only 20 technology transfer offices were set up by 1980 and Bayh-Dole induced the
proliferation of technology transfer offices).
185
Association of University Technology Managers—Technology Transfer Offices,
http://www.autm.net/directory/search_org_results.cfm?searchby=all (last visited Nov. 6,
2008).
186
Academics with industry support are more likely to apply for a patent. In 1980, 240
Patents were granted to universities—by 2004, the annual number had reached 3800. See
ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2004, at 2 (2004).
187
In general, there are four types of TTO’s nationwide: (1) Centralized Licensing
Offices: MIT’s technology transfer office is a centralized unit that coordinates all
technology transfer activities university-wide; (2) Decentralized Licensing Offices: John
Hopkins has three different offices for technology transfer—one for the medical school,
one for the Applied Physics Laboratory and one for the rest of the university; (3)
Foundations: The University of Wisconsin has a separate and independent foundation
(WARF) that was specifically set up to handle all activities related to technology transfer;
and (4) Contractors: Research Corporation Technologies Inc. has handled technology
transfer activities for many universities. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: ADMINISTRATION OF THE BAHY-DOLE ACT BY RESEARCH
UNIVERSITIES, GAO/RCED 98–126 (May 7, 1998).
188
For example, while many offices handle material transfer agreements between
researchers and outside entities, the University of California does not.
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Some offices are also involved in creating start-up firms based
on faculty innovation, educating the faculty regarding intellectual
property (IP) and licensing issues, and holding regular seminars to
discuss IP issues with faculty. Outside of a university’s general
counsel, the officers of the technology transfer offices are possibly
the only attorneys that most academic scientists regularly interact
with. 189
Unfortunately, “[a]cademic researchers and the technology
transfer office at their universities have had a prickly relationship .
. . .” 190 Not only do the two professions deal with two very
different subject matters very differently, scientists and technology
transfer officers—and particularly those with legal training—also
think differently, in vastly different time frames, and with different
goals in mind. For example, scientists, in their drive towards
progressive approximations of the truth, unhurriedly seek out and
attempt to solve universal problems. Time is on the side of
scientists, and they can afford to wait for the best answer.
Meanwhile, in the short term, scientists are often satisfied with
unknowns, unsolvables, and impossibles. In contrast, even with
the tacit acknowledgement that many complex issues cannot
themselves be resolved, lawyers attempt to, nevertheless, resolve
the questions brought before them now, not in some specified or
indeterminate future. 191 Having technology transfer offices and
scientists working together on the same project with—often
unstated but typically implicit—different processes, goals and
timelines, can be somewhat harrowing for both the technology
transfer professional and the scientist. 192

189

See, for example, varied documents on technology transfer websites outlining their
missions and goals, including Yale University Office of Cooperative Research,
http://yale.edu/ocr (last visited Jan. 30, 2009) and University of California Technology
Transfer, http://www.ucop.edu/ott (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
190
Editorial, More than Money; Technology Transfer Offices are Learning from Their
Mistakes, 440 NATURE 845, 845 (2006).
191
While “no generalization is wholly true—not even this one,” scientists, unlike
lawyers, tend to think in the long term. See THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 368 (Fred R.
Shapiro ed., Yale University Press 2006) (attributing quote to Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr.).
192
Typical comments include these by Chris Johnson, a computer science professor at
the University of Utah:
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Notwithstanding this Article’s aversion to the technology
transfer office in its current form, there remains substantial
sympathy for the plight of the technology transfer officers. The
job of a technology transfer officer is not easy. Patent prosecution,
maintaining patent portfolios, and licensing are non-trivial, often
complex, tasks, and these responsibilities frequently stress the
systems that are often not designed or funded to carry anything
approaching such loads or expenses. 193 Additionally, Bayh-Dole
imposes considerable regulatory requirements and restrictions that
require technology transfer officers to constantly coax and
convince uncooperative and uninterested faculty members to
complete invention disclosures for their discoveries.194 It’s not

The tech transfer office saw inventions as a way to augment the
shrinking university budget and [was] overly aggressive in trying to
make money,” says Johnson. “For us, the better research opportunity
was to make it open-source, but they didn’t want to do that. It was all
very frustrating. My philosophy was that, yes, I could make money,
but I wanted to do it in a way that benefited more than just me, but
also my research and my lab, and allow the software to get into realworld situations. Money wasn’t the primary motivation. The whole
process was so onerous. Since then, in the last year or so, the tech
transfer office has been completely reformulated. Thankfully.
Ed Silverman, The Trouble with Tech Transfer: Fighting Tech Transfer—and Winning,
21 SCIENTIST 40, 43 (2007); see also O. Prem Das, Building Relationships with
Technology Transfer Officers, BIOENTREPRENEUR, May 23, 2005, available at
http://www.nature.com/bioent/2005/050501/full/bioent861.html (noting how effective
technology transfer is enhanced by a strong relationship between technology transfer
personnel and the researcher).
193
For example, in 2004, most technology transfer offices had less than five full time
employees and spent at least 250 thousand dollars on legal fees, with six institutions
spending at least four million dollars. See AUTM U.S. LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2004,
supra note 186, at 24.
194
The Bayh-Dole Act requires universities to set patent policies that encourage
patenting and inventing. Other Bayh-Dole obligations include: (i) the filing of a patent
on any inventions that the university wishes to claim; (ii) written agreements signed by
the faculty that acknowledges that faculty must disclose all inventions and assign
ownership to the institution; and (iii) technology transfer offices must use any excess
revenue from royalties and fees to support research. See, e.g., Implementation of
Proposition 71: Options for Handling Intellectual Property Associated with Stem Cell
Research Grants, at the J. Informational Hearing of the S. Health Comm. Subcomm. on
Stem Cell Research Oversight Assemb. Health and Assemb. Judiciary Comms. (Cal.
2005), available at http://www.senate.ca.gov/ftp/SEN/COMMITTEE/STANDING/
HEALTH/_home/PROP_71_IP_BENNETT.doc (testimony of Alan Bennett, Associate
Vice Chancellor for Research, UC Davis).
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hard to understand why interactions with technology transfer
offices by faculty are often strained and seen in a negative light by
both sides. 195
Not only do academics feel harassed by technology transfer
officers, but technology transfer offices are criticized by academics
for not doing enough to commercialize their inventions. Some
faculty members feel that their inventions are ignored or
undervalued by the technology transfer office and take up valuable
time insisting that their disclosures be transformed into
applications and licensed at unreasonable fees. 196
Nonetheless, notwithstanding this empathy for the technology
transfer offices, the implementation of patent and licensing policies
by these technology transfer offices is seen by many as the source
of many of the negative consequences of Bayh-Dole. 197
1. The Technology Transfer Office’s Effect on Research
While only a small minority of these offices is actually
profitable, 198 their near-ubiquity in universities continues—
possibly because of alumni pressure, the administration, or
195

See generally Jason Owen-Smith & Walter Powell, To Patent or Note: Faculty
Decisions and Institutional Success at Technology Transfer, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 99
(2001) (noting that faculty dissatisfaction with technology transfer offices translates into
independent faculty startups—which are increasing in frequency—indicating a growing
unhappiness with the technology transfer offices and, further, that because many
technology transfer offices are overworked, they delay applications, miss deadlines and
drag on license negotiations, all creating uneasiness between faculty and technology
transfer professionals).
196
See, e.g., Silverman, supra note 192, at 40 (“[T]he TTO failed to recognize the
potential value, balked at the cost of filing a patent application, and didn’t pursue any
leads, which ended up scuttling a chance to cut a licensing deal with a company.”
(quoting a genetics researcher at UCLA)).
197
Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 31, at 320 (“Many of the issues that are identified
today as negative consequences of Bayh-Dole can be traced to the institutional policies . .
. rather than to the Act itself.”). Contra Sheila Kirschenbaum, Patenting Basic Research
Myths and Realities, 5 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1025, 1026 (2002) (noting that technology
transfer offices are invaluable for advancing research objectives and patenting).
198
Returns on academic research hover around an average of 5%, at most 10%, for the
most profitable institutions. It is unlikely that licensing can adequately subsidize new
research. See, e.g., Gregory K. Sobolski, John H. Barton & Ezekial J. Emanuel,
Technology Licensing; Lessons from the US Experience, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3137
(2005).
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regional politician’s expectation that the office will find, patent,
and license the next big thing. 199 But, while some licenses may be
a boon for universities and some academic inventors, the majority
of income derived from licensing of academic innovation
nationwide comes out of a handful of licensing offices, most of
which predated Bayh-Dole, and even those take relatively little
revenue home relative to the costs necessary to generate those
innovations. 200 Further, those offices that are profitable typically
rely on one or two innovations to maintain that profitability.
More often than not, technology transfer offices drain
university resources, promising the sky but delivering little.
Further, they drain the resources and time of the researchers who
must cooperate with the TTOs to draft and license patents. With
their monopolistic hold on all licensing efforts in the university,
technology transfer offices may also inhibit many entrepreneurial
efforts by the researchers themselves—stunting the growth of a
patent-friendly environment in academia and hampering
independent academia-industry collaborations. Finally, with their
indiscriminate and invariably slow efforts to license any potential
research innovation, they create a bottleneck in the dissemination
of academic science and innovation. Further, technology transfer
offices, through their common practice of publishing all possible
provisional patent applications, as promoted by the Bayh-Dole
199

See, e.g., id. at 3139 (“[T]he chance to generate significant revenue, however slight
tends to create a distorted perception . . . .”); see also Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the
Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46
ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 464 (2004); Kristen Osenga, Closing In On Open Science: Trends In
Intellectual Property & Scientific Research: Rembrandts In The Research Lab: Why
Universities Should Take A Lesson From Big Business To Increase Innovation, 59 ME. L.
REV. 407, 418 (2007); The Lemelson-MIT Intel Prop. Workshop, How Does Intellectual
Property Support the Creative Process of Invention? 10, http://web.mit.edu/INVENT/npressrelease/downloads/ip.pdf (Rochelle Dreyfuss notes that technology transfer has
become the “new football”).
200
See Leaf, supra note 96; see also Wayne C. Johnson, Changing Interfaces Between
the Research University and Industry, Presentation at the 2005 Engingeering Research
Council
Workshop
and
Forum
(Feb.
27,
2005),
available
at
http://www.asee.org/asee/conferences/erc/2005/upload/wayne-c-johnson.pdf (“Of 3200
universities, perhaps 6 have made significant amounts of money from their intellectual
property rights. IP rights should be pursued as a means for interaction with industry
rather than as a means for raising revenue from commercialization.”(quoting John C.
Hurt of the National Science Foundation)).
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legislation, 201 waste university funds and researchers’ time in
drafting patents that may never get anywhere, or languish in the
TTO as the office works feverishly to promote those developments
that seem to be the most profitable.
While individually small, the combined interruptions caused
by technology transfer officers on individual labs quickly adds up,
taking away precious time and resources from research.202
Further, many common practices in technology transfer offices
serve to limit outside access to the underlying scientific data, often
for an extra year. 203
Few successful technology transfer offices win the
metaphorical technology transfer lottery: successfully licensing
one or, rarely, two blockbuster innovations. 204 The obsession with
winning the technology transfer lottery is somewhat contagious,
and technology transfer offices note that some faculty also become
too invention-focused, demanding that every invention disclosure
end up as a high profile licensed patent. 205
With the growing realization that they are often a drain on
tight university resources, the technology transfer offices are
perversely incentivized to aggressively ramp-up their search for the
next big thing in an effort to show their worthiness to the
university administration. Recent scholarship from the Kauffman

201

35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1) (2006) (disposition of rights).
See, e.g., Leaf, supra note 96; see also Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and
Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 228
(2006) (“Encroachment of traditional sharing norms now often comes from university
intellectual property policies codified in faculty handbooks and in the instructions of TTO
personnel . . . .”).
203
See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 202, at 248 (noting that in fiscal year 2004, 75% of the
applications filed by universities, hospitals and institutes were provisional).
204
“Most universities have not earned much money from royalties; the odds of making
anything substantial from patenting a new discovery are extremely small. Still, the
extraordinary success of a few patents and the many millions of dollars in royalties
earned each year by a small minority of schools are enough to keep scores of institutions
scouring their labs for commercially valuable innovations.” DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN
THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 77 (2003).
205
See, e.g., Sean M. O’Connor, Wash. Univ., Opening the Bottleneck: Statutory and
Regulatory Reforms for Tech Transfer, Presentation at the DePaul University College of
Law Center for Intellectual Property Law and Information Technology, 2004 Intellctual
Property Scholars Conference (Oct. 2004).
202
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Foundation highlights these issues, finding that the current
system’s “home run” mentality works to inhibit rather than
promote commercialization of scientific and technological
research. 206 This attitude produces a monopolistic approach to
revenue maximization and places that ideal ahead of potentially
greater social goods related to university output maximization.
Although acknowledging that the probability of licensing
that next blockbuster patent is slim, nevertheless, given that the
potential payoffs can be in the hundreds of millions of dollars, the
technology transfer office and its home university can still
rationally choose to chase every potential patent. In order to
overcome this drive, the alternative opportunity has to be
substitutable—equally valued in the eyes of the university. 207
2. Material Transfer Agreements
Another overburdening document to come out of the
technology transfer office explosion is the relatively recent
phenomenon of material transfer agreements. These may arguably
have directly resulted from, or at least have been facilitated by, the
introduction of technology transfer offices. 208
Simplistically, material transfer agreements (or “MTAs”) are
contracts delineating the terms of use for a shared resource, most
often concerning the transfer of material (typically biological)
and/or data, principally for research purposes. Material transfer
agreements exist between inter-industry collaborations, universityuniversity collaborations, and in industry-university collaborative
206

See generally Robert E. Litan, Lesa Mitchell & E.J. Reedy, Commercializing
University Innovations: Alternative Approaches, 8 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 31, 31
(2007); see also Intellectual Property: Universities, Corporations and Finding a
Common Ground 1, 9 (Am. Soc. for Eng’g Educ., White Paper, 2006), available at
http://www.asee.org/activities/organizations/councils/edc/2006-IP-WhitePaper/IPWhitePaper-WEB.doc (“MIT’s Preston agrees that too many tech transfer offices
are overly preoccupied with elusive licensing revenues.”).
207
Although, note that such calculations would not take into account the expected
utility to society resulting from the patenting of each and every innovation.
208
See Wendy D. Streitz & Alan B. Bennett, Material Transfer Agreements: A
University Perspective, 133 PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 10, 11 (2003) (noting that the UC system
executed 2000 MTAs in 2002 and that MTAs can have a significant impact on careers of
student scientists, limiting their ability to publish).
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efforts. Many in academia find the agreements to be burdensome
and tedious at best.
MTAs are also particularly useful at restricting access to
patented technologies that could not be restricted without
potentially being held liable for patent misuse. 209 Without the
MTAs, patented technology might still be accessible to researchers
who are enabled by the patent or subsequent publications. MTAs
may potentially also be considered prior art and invalidate any
subsequent resulting patents. 210
“Even researchers who routinely accept such conditions . . .
bemoan the tangled web that MTAs have become. . . . [I]t’s ‘a
They generally dissuade
horrendous problem’ . . . .” 211
cooperation with future collaborators that do not want to be
hampered by third party contracts. MTAs can also hamper followon innovation by allowing the contracting parties to assert
ownership over the subsequent innovations resulting from the
original material transferred. With limited rights in any subsequent
innovations, researchers may be dissuaded from conducting
productive research. Unfortunately, a large majority of published
research will require access to physical materials from the patent
holder, the transfer of which will trigger an MTA resulting in
restriction of use of the technology.
One of the main goals of an MTA is to outline the rights of
the provider and the users with regard to the materials, themselves,
and any derivative data or materials derived from experiments with
the initial material. Limitations on material and data typically
involve issues of confidentiality, publication embargoes, and
limitations on the type of research that can be conducted. In
extreme cases MTAs may even demand reach-through intellectual
property rights. 212 Reach-through rights guarantee either that the
209

Patent misuse refers to an impermissible attempt to expand either the scope of the
patent or to exact monopoly protections beyond its temporal scope. See Mallinckrodt,
Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Patent misuse will often
parallel the anticompetitive goals of antitrust law. See, e.g., id. at 708.
210
See generally Victor Rodriguez, Material Transfer Agreements: Open Science vs.
Proprietary Claims, 23 NATURE BIOTECH. 489 (2005).
211
Elliot Marshal, Need a Reagent? Just Sign Here, 278 SCIENCE 212, 212 (1997).
212
“At the same time that the numbers of MTAs are increasing, so is their complexity,
with restrictions and obligations potentially reaching far beyond the material itself, to

VOL19_BOOK2_GREENBAUM

2009]

2/26/2009 3:47:32 AM

ACADEMIA TO INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

363

provider of the material is granted an automatic license to use any
discoveries arising out of her material, or that the owner of the
material gets royalty payments for any revenue brought in by
discoveries made with the material. These agreements go against
many of the basic customs of science, and apply to material that
would have, in the past, been shared freely and without much
inhibition. MTAs also tend to require complex legal and timeconsuming negotiations.
Given the contractual (and non-IP) nature of MTAs, they often
dispense with the fair use and whatever research exceptions are
available under patent and copyright law: fair uses may be
contractually overridden, and the future attempts to reinvigorate
the research exemption in patents, 213 or other flexibilities directed
at academic research, will be moot if academic institutions and
corporations contract around them anyway with their MTAs. 214
Efforts by the National Institutes of Health, and the
introduction of the Uniform Biological Material Transfer
Agreement (or “UBMTA”), have attempted to simplify and
harmonize the MTA process through creating a straightforward
and streamlined MTA to be used by all academic institutions. 215
Nevertheless, in spite of the original interest in UBMTAs, many
technology transfer offices do not use them at all or use them only
as starting, alterable templates. 216 But, even when they are used as

data or inventions made using the material and to derivative materials. Because MTAs
are contractual agreements between two parties, they typically do not have the
geographic or temporal limitations of patented technologies and can, consequently, be
much farther reaching than the scope of patent rights.” Streitz & Bennett, supra note 208,
at 11.
213
See, e.g., Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 31, at 321; Kenneth Neil Cukier,
Navigating the Future(s) of Biotech Intellectual Property, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 249, 251
(2006); Paulette Walker Campbell, Pacts Between Universities and Companies Worry
Federal Officials; Research Agencies Fear that the Restrictions in Some Agreements May
Impede Scientific Progress, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 15, 1998, at A37.
214
See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 202, at 273–74 (calling for extended grace periods for
scientific researchers).
215
See Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement: Discussion of Public
Comments Received; Publication of the Final Format of the Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg.
12,771 (Mar. 8, 1995).
216
See, e.g., Arti Rai & Rebecca Eisenberg, The Public Domain: Bayh-Dole reform and
the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 305–06 (2003); see also
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initially intended, UBMTAs present some of the same problems to
academic research. 217
They still allow for the delay of
publications, are often customized through time-consuming
negotiation, are still perceived to be too complex, limit the use of
materials, sometimes create overburdening confidentiality
requirements, and are an additional step that must be completed in
order to conduct scientific research. 218
Without a local technology transfer office to facilitate and
negotiate MTAs, one could expect them to become too
burdensome for even the owner of the MTA and eventually a more
simplistic academic model may arise.
3. Joint Research Agreements
Joint Research Agreements are another outgrowth of the
legal and business environment created by technology transfer
offices and can, like MTAs, pose a substantial roadblock to
scientific innovation. Joint research agreements (or “JRAs”) have
become more important subsequent to the passing of the
Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement Act
(“CREATE”), 219 another effort by Congress to promote industryacademia interactions. 220
Megan Ristau Baca, Barriers To Innovation: Intellectual Property Transaction Costs In
Scientific Collaboration, 4 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. ¶¶ 28–29 (2006).
217
The growing concern over MTAs and their effect on research is growing as
indicated by AUTM’s creation of an interest group on MTAs in 2003. See Rodriguez,
supra note 210, at 489.
218
Recent results suggest that MTAs may cause significant friction in the transfer of
materials and information, even between academic scientists. See JOHN P. WALSH,
CHARLENE CHO & WESLEY M. COHEN, PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS TO
RESEARCH INPUTS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH (Sept. 20, 2005), available at
http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=776&cf=8 (noting that while
patenting did not have a major effect on research projects, MTAs, which made up 40% of
all research transfers, do pose threats to researchers).
219
35 U.S.C § 103(c) (2006).
220
See Bagley, supra note 202, at 237.
This bill makes a narrow but important change in our patent laws to
ensure that the American public will benefit from the results of
collaborative research efforts that combine the erudition of great
public universities with the entrepreneurial savvy of private
enterprises. . . . [W]e must encourage—not discourage—public
institutions and private entrepreneurs to combine their respective
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The Federal Circuit in Kimberly-Clark, 221 following
precedent set by its predecessor court in In re Clemens 222 and In re
Bass, 223 ruled that a strict interpretation of the obviousness
standard in 35 U.S.C. § 103 would include secret prior art—i.e.,
prior art that is not yet publicly known or available—as a type of
prior art that could invalidate a patent for obviousness. 224
Importantly for cooperating researchers, this even included
instances where that secret prior art was only discussed among
research collaborators.
Realizing that this might chill communication between
collaborators during the inventive process, Congress amended the
Patent Act in 1984 to, among other things, create a safe harbor for
some forms of secret prior art by excluding materials that were
passed among collaborators and co-inventors, excluding these from
the definition of invalidating prior art. 225 “New technology often
is developed by using background scientific or technical
information known within an organization but unknown to the
public. The bill, by disqualifying such background information
from prior art, will encourage communication among members of

talents in joint research efforts. Indeed Congress committed itself to
this principle when it passed the Bayh-Dole Amendments to the
Patent Act.
Id. (quoting Senator Orin Hatch during his introduction of the CREATE Act).
221
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
222
In re Clemens, 622 F.2d 1029 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
223
In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
224
Kimberly-Clark, 745 F.2d 1437, 1444–46. The patent law requires that the
invention not be obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention’s conception in light of the teaching of the prior art. See 2-5 CHISUM ON
PATENTS § 5.01 (“The general purpose behind the requirement of nonobviousness . . .
serves to limit patent monopolies to those innovations that in fact serve to advance the
state of the useful arts. New problems arise and call for new solutions. A patent
monopoly may issue only for those literally new solutions that are beyond the grasp of
the ordinary artisan who had a full understanding of the pertinent prior art.”).
225
Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383, § 103
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 103) (“Subject matter developed by another person,
which qualifies as prior art only under subsection (f) or (g) of section 102 of this title,
shall not preclude patentability under this section where the subject matter and the
claimed invention were, at the time the invention was made, owned by the same person
or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.”).
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research teams, and patenting, and consequently
dissemination, of the results of “team research.” 226

public

Nevertheless, despite Congressional efforts, the law
remained unclear on the issue of collaborators from different
organizations, i.e., collaborators in different universities, 227 and, in
1997, was narrowly construed by the Federal Circuit in OddzOn
Products, Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc. 228 to be limited to instances
wherein the collaborators were actually both in the same
organization. 229 The OddzOn ruling created the potential for a
substantial chilling effect for open discussion among collaborators,
particularly the many public-private research and development
collaborations.
Apportionment of patents rights between
collaborators would not get around the problem of invalidating
secret prior art because federal granting agencies required that the
granted university retain sole ownership of the invention, only
licensing the rights to the private-sector research partners. 230
The CREATE act was designed to overrule this narrow
interpretation of §103 in an effort to promote greater collaboration
among researchers in different organizations: “Congress intends to
extend this exemption [from the 1984 Patent Law Amendments] to
‘joint research agreement’ inventors, who may represent more than
one organization . . . .” 231
226

Legislative History of the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Section-By-Section
Analysis of H.R. 6286, Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, 130 Cong. Rec. H10525–
529 (Oct. 1, 1984) (inserted by Representative Kastenmier, chairman of the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary),
available at http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/Legislative_History1984.pdf.
227
But see, e.g., Patent Law and Non-Profit Research Collaboration: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property and the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Carl E. Gulbrandsen, Ph.D., Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation and the Council on Government Relations) (“The
legislative history of the 1984 amendment clearly establishes that subsection 103(c) was
[designed to help encourage teamwork at least] within organizations”). Given the text of
subsection 103(c) and its legislative history, it is clear that the enactment of subsection
103(c) sought to encourage teamwork among researchers, rather than stifle team
research. 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2006).
228
Oddzon Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396(Fed. Cir. 1997).
229
Id. at 1403 (ruling that private and confidential material between collaborators at
different institutions may be seen as prior art for finding obviousness).
230
See H.R. Rep. No. 108-425 (2004).
231
Id. at 6.
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(c)(1) Subject matter developed by another person,
which qualifies as prior art only under one or more
of subsections (e), (f), and (g) of section 102 of this
title [35 U.S.C. § 102], shall not preclude
patentability under this section where the subject
matter and the claimed invention were, at the time
the claimed invention was made, owned by the
same person or subject to an obligation of
assignment
to
the
same
person.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, subject matter
developed by another person and a claimed
invention shall be deemed to have been owned by
the same person or subject to an obligation of
assignment to the same person if—
(A) the claimed invention was made by or on
behalf of parties to a joint research agreement that
was in effect on or before the date the claimed
invention was made;
(B) the claimed invention was made as a result
of activities undertaken within the scope of the joint
research agreement; and
(C) the application for patent for the claimed
invention discloses or is amended to disclose the
names of the parties to the joint research agreement.
(3) For purposes of paragraph (2), the term “joint
research agreement” means a written contract,
grant, or cooperative agreement entered into by two
Oddzon represents a significant potential threat to inventors who
engage in collaborative research and development projects. Put
another way, the decision created a situation where an otherwise
patentable invention may be rendered nonpatentable on the basis of
confidential information routinely exchanged between research
partners. Thus, parties who enter into a clearly defined and
structured research relationship, but who do not (or cannot) elect to
define a common ownership interest in or a common assignment of
inventions jointly developed, can unwittingly create an obstacle to
patent protection by simply exchanging secret information among
themselves.
Id. at 5.

367
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or more persons or entities for the performance of
experimental, developmental, or research work in
the field of the claimed invention. 232
Although CREATE intended to promote further
collaboration among public and private institutions, it has the
dubious distinction of incorporating further bureaucracy and
uncertainty into the commodification process. It forces putative
collaborators to first carefully structure a written collaboration
agreement—i.e., a joint research agreement—prior to sharing
information and their current research—effectively requiring
scientific collaborations to initially practice at arm’s length and,
through their technology transfer personnel, increasing the initial
costs of beginning a collaboration. These JRAs cannot be written
off the cuff; they need to be written broad enough such that the
resulting product, and eventual field of research fall within the
scope of the JRA. “The Act thus places a premium on well
documented collaborative research activities.” 233 Often they are
written following substantial time-consuming negotiations between
academics and their technology transfer offices.
Further, the legislative history suggests that in order to claim
the safe harbor exemption of the CREATE act, the relevant parties
need to be publicly disclosed—which may further chill publicprivate collaborative research that benefits from anonymity.
Some have suggested that the increased usage of JRAs will
also result in more IP litigation focused on infringing academics.
JRAs create joint responsibilities and interests in the intellectual
property. These interests are protected by all the partners in the
JRA—unifying their resources and strengthening their ability to
target anyone they want and potentially scaring off risk-averse
users of the technology. 234 Further, there are concerns that the lag
time resulting from the need to negotiate the agreement up front
232

35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2006).
Kenneth Meyers, Joint Research Agreements and the CREATE Act 2004: IP Value
in the Life Sciences Industries, Feb. 2006, http://www.finnegan.com/files/PDFs/
200812110431237535804news914.pdf.
234
Ann E. Mills, Donna T. Chen, John Gillon, Jr. & Patti M. Tereskerz, The CREATE
Act: Increasing Costs Associated with the Biotech Industry?, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 785,
786 (2006).
233
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prior to any potentially fruitful collaboration with another
institution may further hamper scientific innovation.
Technology transfer offices are typically not staffed by
lawyers, and, as such, some JRA experts warn technology transfer
staff to be especially aware of the number of pitfalls and traps in
the CREATE act. 235 Like MTAs, JRAs have become more
complicated and time-consuming because of the availability of
technology transfer professionals. As long as universities have
technology transfer offices, there is little incentive for universities
and academics to lobby to change the current state of the CREATE
Act.
4. General Issues in University Industry Relationships
If nothing else, universities’ licensing offices, set up after
Bayh-Dole in the hopes of patenting the next blockbuster drug,
have created a mechanism for increasing and maintaining
relationships between academia and industry 236 that could
potentially be exploited by either or both parties. Public-private
partnerships are considered critical elements for the future of basic
and clinical research. 237 And, public-private partnerships, while
more difficult and subject to additional delays, often are less likely
to abort prematurely than their homogenous counterparts. 238

235
See Nixon Peabody LLP, Technology & Intellectual Property Alert, Jan. 2005,
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_media/publications/TIPA_01282005.pdf.
236
These relationships have been very beneficial to industry. See, e.g., David
Blumenthal, Nancyanne Causino, Eric Campbell & Karen Louis, Relationships Between
Academic Institutions and Industry in the Life Sciences—An Industry Survey, 334 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 368, 373 (1996) (suggesting “that research ties with academic institutions
have demonstrable benefits for sponsors, that these benefits persist over time, that lifescience companies remain financially committed to university research, and that
universities are well positioned to compete for industry funds”). Note also that the U.S.
government has a vested interest in promoting these types of relationships as indicated by
the recent effort by Congress in legislating the CREATE act of 2004.
237
See generally David Hill et al., Academia-Industry Collaboration: An Integral
Element for Building “Omic” Resources, 14 GENOME RES. 2010 (2004); see also Joshua
Newberg & Richard Dunn, Keeping Secrets in the Campus Law: Law, Values and Rules
of Engagement for Industry-University R&D Partnerships, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 187, 187
(2002).
238
Bronwyn H. Hall, Albert Link & John T. Scott, Universities as Research Partners,
85 REV. ECON. & STATS. 485, 487 (2003).
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Overall estimates have shown industry supporting thousands of
projects 239 during the nineties. 240
Universities are beginning to realize that many of their industry
relationships are now more important than ever: Science funding
has had an unprecedented ride over the last few years, particularly
in the United States. Inexplicably, while other United States
government agencies regularly get budget cuts, science funding
has been growing at a steady clip until recently. Total research and
development spending for 2004 was $41.25 billion, up from $38.5
billion in 2003, 241 but this will not last forever. Already the budget
for government funding of biomedical science seems to be
stagnating, barely keeping up, if at all, with inflation. 242 While
industry’s contribution to public R&D funding is still, for the most
part, in the single digit billions, 243 it may grow in the near future
and will be particularly important, if and when the nation’s science
budget begins to decline. 244 Those institutions that have strong
industry ties will probably benefit the most as industry’s role in
science funding grows. 245
A number of forward-looking
technology transfer offices have actually begun to focus more on
creating fruitful partnerships than on controlling technology
transfer, often prioritizing one over the other during negotiations
with industry. 246

239

Eric Campbell et al., Inside the Triple Helix: Technology Transfer and
Commercialization in the Life Science, 23 HEALTH AFF. 64, 66 (2004).
240
Id. (noting that it was at a cost of $1.5 billion).
241
See AUTM U.S. LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2004, supra note 186, at 24.
242
See, e.g., J. Michael Bishop & Harold Varmus, Re-Aim Blame for NIH’s Hard
Times, 312 SCIENCE 499, 499 (2006) (noting that NIH will have 11% less spending power
in 2007 than it had in 2004).
243
Industry funded research is growing but not substantially. Industry funding towards
academic R&D was $2.8 billion in 2004 and $2.8 billion in 2003. See AUTM U.S.
LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2004, supra note 186, at 24.
244
But see Blumenthal et al., supra note 236, at 372 (“[A]cademic institutions may not
be able to depend heavily on industrial support to maintain their intellectual vitality. . . .
[A]lthough it is a substantial complement to federal support, industrial sponsorship
remains small as compared with NIH funding. It therefore seems unlikely that industrial
funding could make up for any appreciable reduction in funding from the NIH.”).
245
Although, note that “most research contracts with industry are small and shortlived.” Id.
246
From author’s personal conversations with technology transfer officers.
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There are many positive components to such interactions
including, (i) opportunities for industry jobs for graduate students
or postdocs, (ii) availability of high-end instrumentation that may
be beyond the budget of an academic institution but available
through industry contacts, (iii) new approaches and directions to
research, and (iv) industry funding. Unfortunately, though, many
industry collaborations have been of short duration and with
minimal monetary input from industry. 247
However, a focus on fostering industry-academia partnerships
may also end up hurting science, as technology transfer offices
may be more inclined to license to industry at favorable terms and
conditions to industry, with less than optimal terms for researchers
or for society. Some argue that the technology transfer offices are
actually straining the relationship between industry and academia.
Industry representatives recently told a subcommittee of the House
of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology, headed
by Representative David Wu of Oregon, that technology transfer
offices are typically overly concerned with money and are
insensitive to the needs of industry. 248 Frustrated companies told
stories of prolonged lengthy negotiations with uncompromising
technology transfer officers. 249
As opposed to enhancing
relationships, these offices may be hurting and hampering
productive relationships, sending disgruntled corporate academic
liaisons to other universities and potentially other countries in
search of better collaborators. 250

247

See Virginia Gewin, The Technology Trap, 437 NATURE 948, 948 (2005) (noting that
many companies are now backing away from dealing with academia and the flow of
research dollars from industry to academia has slowed).
248
The Bayh-Dole Act (P.L. 96-517, Amendments to the Patent and Trademark Act of
1980): The Next 25 Years: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Science and Technology,
Subcomm. on Technology and Innovation, 110th Cong. (2007).
249
Id.
250
See, e.g., Bernadette Tansey, The Building of Biotech 25 Years Later, 1980 BayhDole Act Honored as Foundation of an Industry, S.F. CHRON., June 21, 2005, available
at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/06/21/BUG6JDBOSP1.DTL&
hw=the+BUilding+of+biotech&sn=001&sc=1000 (“The companies that are in a position
to actually translate academic research into useful therapies or products have trouble
negotiating with financially strapped universities who want to recover as much money as
they can from their scientists’ inventions.” (quoting Professor Michael Eisen)).
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B. Effect on Science Fraud
In addition to the possibility of enhanced relationships with
industry, another possible positive secondary effect of technology
transfer offices—and the growing number of industry relationships
fostered by them—might be a reduction of fraud in academic
science. While many fear that the basic ethos of science is under
attack by its corporatization, corporatization has also propelled
science to a new level of professionalism. 251 At this level of
professionalism, fraud and misconduct are less tolerated than they
were in the past. Additionally, with the influx of corporate culture
into science, formerly laissez faire scientists are considerably more
vigilant in weeding out fraud, particularly in the work of
competitors.
In contrast to previous circumstances, where
competing labs could publish similar results simultaneously and
receive equal degrees of credit and prestige for their work, patents
are often a winner-take-all game, and only one lab can be the
winner.
Historically, science was a gentleman’s pursuit. Those who
were independently wealthy, or had a wealthy patron, could afford
to tinker. This was the case even up to the Second World War
when some of the best physics research was conducted at Alfred
Loomis’ sprawling estate in the upscale Manhattan suburb of
Tuxedo Park. 252 With the onset of government funding, however,
science started to become more professional. This continued with
greater vigor following Bayh-Dole and the advent of universal
university technology transfer offices.
For decades, the scientific community has been struggling to
deal with a growing realization that misconduct in basic science
research may be more endemic than previously thought. 253 While
251

The author’s personal experience has shown even the influx of corporate
terminology like “action items” into science.
252
See generally JENNET CONANT, TUXEDO PARK: A WALL STREET TYCOON AND THE
SECRET PALACE OF SCIENCE THAT CHANGED THE COURSE OF WORLD WAR II (2002).
253
“There’s a lot to worry about.” Donald Kennedy, Research Fraud and Public
Policy, 300 SCIENCE 393, 393 (2003) (noting that hard sciences are not the only sciences
that suffer from fraud; in fact, often social scientists have political incentives to commit
fraud, something that exists to a lesser degree in basic science research); see also
Kenneth Ryan, Scientific Imagination and Integrity, 273 SCIENCE 163, 163 (1996) (“The
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the three cardinal sins of fabrication, falsification and plagiarism 254
are committed by a relatively small number of scientists, 255 studies
have found that nearly a third of all scientists have been involved
in some misconduct in their research over the course of their
careers. 256 Ethics courses do not seem to help. 257 Neither fear of

current research environment seems to foster cynicism about simple virtues such as
honesty and fairness, and it clearly fosters hostility toward anyone who makes claims
about misconduct.”); David. S. Oderberg, The Unholy Lust of Scientists: It May Be Time
to Curtail Public Financing of Scientific Research, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 15, 2006,
available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2006/01/
15/INGMDGMDSV1.DTL (“I venture to suggest that contemporary science is now so
corrupted by the lust for loot and glory that nothing less than root-and-branch reform can
save it. . . . How could the millions thrown at scientists be anything other than a veritable
inducement to misconduct? When you combine it with the innumerable honors and
awards that await the next would-be secular savior of humanity, one wonders that fraud is
not even more common than it appears to be.”). But see Gerald Holton & Frederick
Grinnell, Defining Misconduct, 273 SCIENCE 858, 858 (1996) (arguing against these
accusations).
254
See 42 C.F.R. § 50.102 (2001) (“Misconduct or Misconduct in Science means
fabrication, falsification, plagiarism, or other practices that seriously deviate from those
that are commonly accepted within the scientific community for proposing, conducting,
or reporting research. It does not include honest error or honest differences in
interpretations or judgments of data.”). The National Academy of Science suggested
limiting misconduct to just fabrication, falsification and plagiarism. See, e.g., Charles
Walter & Edward P. Richards, Defining Scientific Misconduct for the Benefit of Science,
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/IEEE/ieee23.htm#fn2. But see Jocelyn Kaiser, NSF Stakes a
Position on Misconduct, 276 SCIENCE 1779, 1779 (1997) (citing the National Science
Foundation’s ethics enforcer, Inspector-General Linda Sundro, explaining that the
“serious deviation” clause in the definition of misconduct: “fabrication, falsification,
plagiarism (“FFP”), or other serious deviation from accepted practices,” is the core of the
definition). The NSF is alone in this regard and many other science groups wanted the
term “serious deviation” removed because many scientists found it too vague. As a
result, the White House interagency Committee on Fundamental Science suggested the
term be removed. Id.
255
See, e.g., Georg W. Kreutzberg, The Rules of Good Science, 5 EMBO REP. 330, 330
(2004) (“When scientists hear about scientific fraud, they quickly denounce the culprits
as not being ‘true’ scientists. The true scientist, they argue, is only interested in unveiling
step by step the countless enigmas of nature. He or she labours long hours and weekends
at a desk or in the laboratory to find the truth, not to invent it.”). But see K.J. Breen,
Misconduct in Medical Research: Whose Responsibility?, 33 INTERNAL MED. J. 186
(2003) (noting that these few are far from normal).
256
See, e.g., Brian C. Martinson, Melissa S. Anderson & Raymond de Vries, Scientists
Behaving Badly, 435 NATURE 737, 738 (2005).
257
See, e.g., Charles E. Deutch, A Course in Research Ethics for Graduate Students, 44
COLLEGE TEACHING (1996); see also Caroline Whitbeck, Teaching Ethics to Scientists
and Engineers: Moral Agents and Moral Problems, 1 SCI. & ENG’G ETHICS 229 (1995).
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criminal penalties, 258 nor of civil suits, 259 has in any way lessened
the incidence of fraud.
While archaic yet noble Mertonian ideals arguably still drive
some of the science in this country, 260 it is becoming clearer,
particularly with the significant increase in reports of fraud in
science, that other incentives, particularly monetary, are also
involved in driving academic science, in general, and potentially
driving academic science to fraudulent activity. Thus, while the
lure of patents may drive scientists to work harder, hit more
deadlines, and strive towards potentially lucrative results more
efficiently than the reward of publishing alone, unfortunately the
potential to make money in addition to publishing may push more
scientists to fudge and cheat.
Patents and other imports from industry can be seen as a
strong force against fraud in science. The recent upsurge in
ferreting out fraud, discussing fraud in journals, and teaching about
misconduct in graduate programs may be part of the cultural shift
to a more responsible corporate ideology represented by the culture
of technology transfer offices. Note however that this new
zealousness in finding misconduct may unfortunately, and all too
often, lead to unfounded accusations 261 —the fear of which could
258

See, e.g., Susan Kuzma, Criminal Liability for Misconduct in Scientific Research, 25
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 357, 381 (1992); see also Bratislave Stankovic, Pulp Fiction:
Reflections on Scientific Misconduct, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 975, 978 (2004).
259
For example, under the False Claims Act. See, e.g., Franklin Hoke, Novel
Application Of Federal Law To Scientific Fraud Worries Universities and Reinvigorates
Whistleblowers, 9 SCIENTIST 1, 1 (1995); see also Keith D. Barber, David. B. Honig &
Neal A. Cooper, Prolific Plaintiffs or Rabid Relators? Recent Developments in False
Claims Act Litigation, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 131 (2004); Dan L. Burk, False Claims Act
Can Hamper Science With ‘Bounty Hunter’ Lawsuits, SCIENTIST, Sept. 4, 1995, at 12.
260
ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE (1973). Mertonian Norms
include: (1) Communalism; (2) Universalism; (3) Disinterestedness; (4) Originality; and
(5) Skepticism. See Wikipedia—Robert K. Merton, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_
K._Merton; see also Sheila Jasanoff, Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science,
17 SOC. STUD. SCI. 195, 196 (1987) (noting that science does its best to at least show to
the public that the norms are still in effect).
261
In the United States, the Office of Research Integrity received 267 allegations of
research misconduct in 2006. Research misconduct was found in only 15 of the 28 cases
that it actually closed that year. OFFICE OF RESEARCH INTEGRITY, ANNUAL REPORT 2006,
at 5 (2007) (“Most Federal agencies win most of their cases before hearing offices in their
own agencies. In most cases, the batting average is over 70 or 80 percent.”); Gina
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strain relationships with collaborators, principle investigators,
students, and postdoctoral fellows. 262
Still, there are many positive aspects, with regard to science
misconduct, that have resulted from the technology transfer
culture. Whereas in the past fabrication of results may have helped
a scientist get a prestigious paper published—and that was all she
wanted, itself enough incentive to commit fraud—fraud cannot
help one’s chance of practically applying one’s research with a
patent, suggesting the incentives for science misconduct are
diminished. Moreover, while it is now clear that results are rarely
reproduced by independent laboratories, companies licensing a
patent will want to reproduce results. With the possibility of more
research licensed out to industry, there may be stronger
countervailing forces not to cheat, than to cheat, in research.
Additionally, the technology transfer offices’ common suggestion
that researchers keep meticulous notebooks and records, albeit for
patent-related reasons, can only help prevent fraudulent recording
activity. The licensing professional is also another set of eyes in
her examination of the required invention disclosure and the
documents leading up to a patent, lessening the chance that a
fraudulent result will get past science’s gatekeepers.
Some issues relating to misconduct in science, however,
may not benefit from a greater trend towards patenting and
commercial culture—specifically, the growing issue of conflicts of
interest among researchers, journal reviewers, grant reviewers,
institutional review boards, and institutions. 263 Nowhere is this a

Kolata, Inquiry Lacking Due Process, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1996 at C3. The inability to
make the charges stick even in internal hearings may indicate an even smaller number of
instances of true fraud than the numbers of claimed fraudulent activities indicates and
that most claims of fraud are unfounded.
262
See, e.g., Laura Bonetta, The Aftermath of Scientific Fraud, 124 CELL 873, 875
(2006) (noting the data from the Office of Research Integrity (“ORI”): Of the 2700
allegations of fraud submitted to ORI, there have been to date only 160 findings of actual
fraud).
263
See generally David Blumenthal, Biotech in Northeast Ohio Conference: Conflict of
Interest in Biomedical Research, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 377 (2002).
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greater concern than in the interactions between research labs and
corporations. 264 Others disagree completely. 265
IV. SIGNIFICANT LIMITATIONS WITH THIS ARTICLE—LACK OF
EMPIRICAL DATA
Much of this Article has been written in a speculative fashion.
That is intentional. In fact some of the historical information has
been hyper-cited to draw out an important distinction: the paucity
of empirical information with regard to some of the effects of
Bayh-Dole and technology transfer offices on academic scientific
research.
There is a dearth of hard data on the effect of Bayh-Dole on
basic research, and much of what is available is contradictory.
While some claim that the ‘legal frenzy’ created by Bayh-Dole has
significantly diverted scientists from doing their research, 266 others
have found no indication that the nature of academic research has
changed. 267 “It is too easy for academics and others to raise alarms
when the bases for arguments are conjectural and understanding of
the institutions and behaviors involved so limited.” 268

264

See, e.g., Press Release, Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology,
FASEB Calls on the Scientific Community to Endorse Guideline for Conflicts of
Interest—Unveils
COI
Toolkit
(July
20,
2007),
available
at
http://opa.faseb.org/pdf/July%20-%20Dec%202007/COIPressRelease.07.20.07.pdf
(describing the recent guidelines for conflicts of interest created by the Federation of
American Societies for Experimental Biology recently promulgated in July of 2007).
265
See, e.g., JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY INC. (2004).
266
See Leaf, supra note 96; see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons In Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698,
698 (1998).
267
See, e.g., Lori Pressman et al., The Licensing Of DNA Patents By U.S. Academic
Institutions: An Empirical Survey, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 31 (2006); Jerry Thursby &
Marie Thursby, University Licensing and the Bayh-Dole Act, 301 SCIENCE 1052 (2003);
see also WALSH, CHO & COHEN, supra note 218; John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho & Wesley
M. Cohen, View From The Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002
(2005). Contra ECONOMIST, supra note 29 (“[T]here is ample evidence that scientific
research is being delayed, deterred or abandoned due to the presence of patents and
proprietary technologies.”); see also Ted Agres, Tying Up Science: Are Intellectual
Property Protections Slowing Progress?, SCIENTIST, Jan. 2006, at 77.
268
Cohen, supra note 33.
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Under the pervasive patent culture in universities, more
basic science research tools are now being licensed and sold. In a
post-Madey 269 world, where the courts have emphatically stated
that no one, not even academics, are above the intellectual property
laws, many corporations and universities are more willing to
request, threaten, and/or sue to get universities to license the
proprietary technologies they are using. 270 Although academics
are, at best, typically oblivious to intellectual property issues and
potentially even knowing violators, risk adverse institutions that
receive such cease-and-desist threats have, in the past, shut down
research projects or forced labs to consider alternatives. 271
In an attempt to determine the extent of the effect BayhDole had on the patent culture (although not the technology
transfer office), empirical studies have tried to quantify both the
number of threatening actions and their effect on academia. 272
University concerns about image and lawsuits have, thus far,
impeded the collection of a sample size large enough for robust
statistical analysis. 273 Those that have provided information to
researchers create a self-selecting sample that may understate or
overstate the nature of Bayh-Dole and technology transfer offices
on research.
Inadequate record keeping and lack of faith in the anonymity
of studies make university legal counsels the wrong source of
information for an analysis on the effects on research resulting
from such cease and desist actions. 274 An alternative is to have the
researchers themselves submit this type of information as they
269

Madey v. Duke, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that an academic research
exemption does not exist for research tools).
270
See NAT’L ACADS., FIFTH MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN GENOMIC AND PROTEIN-RELATED INVENTIONS (2005), transcript available at
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/step/Genomics_Committee_Meeting_6_
transcript.pdf.
271
See Cukier, supra note 213, at 249 (noting that patent law never anticipated many of
the issues arising out of patenting research tools and genomics data—principally the
inability to work around the patent).
272
Id.
273
Id.
274
Additionally, as opposed to patent data, licensing information and practices are
typically viewed as proprietary and, thus, universities are often unwilling to divulge
information. See, e.g., Pressman et al., supra note 267.
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receive and react to it. Moreover, with regard to issues like
MTAs, sometimes a student or postdoctoral fellow may be the best
source of information. Surveys typically poll only the principle
investigators who may be woefully uninformed about the true facts
on the ground.
V. PROPOSED TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PARADIGM FOR
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING NATIONS
This Article argues that the American system ought not be seen
as a paradigm for developing nations intent on setting up their own
technology transfer mechanisms between academia and industry.
In fact, other developed nations somewhat vary from the U.S. in
implementation of technology transfer. This section will provide a
brief overview of some other national mentalities and mechanisms
for transferring knowledge and innovation to industry. This
Article suggests that there are some very useful components and
ideas in other systems of technology transfer that can be imported
into the American system or, alternatively, incorporated into a
novel system implementable both in developed and developing
nations.
Implementation in the U.S. would require a complete overhaul
of the current system. Its execution in a developing nation,
however, might be easier and more efficient than implementing a
comprehensive Bayh-Dole-like system from scratch.
This
comprehensive option for both developed and developing nations
would serve to promote scientific research in their universities, and
at the same time, advance innovation throughout the country.
Although the solution presented herein is framed in the context of
revamping the American system, and while the implementation of
this system might be radically different in the context of a
developed country, the overall structure of this solution can be
applied equally well to developing nations. Nevertheless, it is
helpful to present the solution within the framework of the current
U.S. system, as it allows for comparison.
Taken as a whole, the following inventor-centric proposal
contrasts starkly with Bayh-Dole, whose legislative history
suggests that it was not enacted for the benefit of the individual

VOL19_BOOK2_GREENBAUM

2009]

2/26/2009 3:47:32 AM

ACADEMIA TO INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

379

researchers. Rather, “the intended beneficiaries of the Bayh-Dole
Act are the institutions themselves and the government.” 275 And,
unlike Bayh-Dole which mandates that researchers report and
patent all patentable innovation, the proposed system would try to
incentivize, but never force the commodification of, basic science
research. In this sense, the system is also somewhat of a hybrid:
while it suggests that academics transfer their patentable inventions
to a centralized technology transfer office in exchange for further
research grants, it allows for the inventor to hold on to some of her
innovation, either patenting it and licensing it herself, or choosing
to either let it fall into the public domain or keep it as a secret.
However, like Bayh-Dole, this Article assumes that a
technology transfer system is a critical feature in the development
process of new technologies both in developed and developing
nations. While university researchers are often highly skilled at
unearthing fundamental discoveries, they are woefully unequipped
to commercially develop, manufacture, and market these
innovations—and innovation and entrepreneurship are most likely
to emerge from universities. There is “No better text for a History
of Entrepreneurship . . . than the creation and development of the
modern university.” 276 With this is mind, it is essential that some
form of a qualified office be set up that can evaluate, patent and
market academic innovations to industry.

275

Platzer v. Sloan Kettering Inst. for Cancer Research, 787 F. Supp. 360, 364–65
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); see Sara Rimer, A Warning Against Mixing Commerce and Academics,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2003, at D9 (“Unlike athletics . . . commercialization of research is
still relatively new, and universities are not yet bound irrevocably to indefensible
policies. Only time will tell if they manage to do a better job of maintaining appropriate
standards for science than they have done in upholding academic value on their playing
fields.” (quoting Derek Bok)). Note, however, that the case discusses instances where the
inventor wants a larger percentage of the royalties and, in response, the court claims that
the Bayh-Dole act was intended to funnel the money back into research, not to enrich the
inventors. Arguably then, it’s possible that current state of affairs frustrates the purpose
of Bayh-Dole. Sending royalties back to the institution is potentially more wasteful,
given the administrative costs in divvying up the royalties, initially, and then putting
them back into research projects. It might be more efficient, and more in-line with the
purpose of Bayh-Dole, to give the royalties directly to the researcher in the form of a
grant that has to be used entirely on research. See Platzer, 787 F. Supp. at 368.
276
PETER F. DRUCKER, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 22 (2006).
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This Article proposes a multi-part solution. It requires the
creation of a new paradigm of technology transfer offices, the
licensing of all or most of academic innovation at a flat rate, and
the creation of a grant system wherein the rights to patentable
innovation are traded for grant money to be used for funding
further research in the innovating lab. While academic scientists
as a self-selecting group is not heavily populated with wealthseeking individuals, 277 their “begging and searching for money [for
research] never stops.” 278 It makes sense, then, to provide
incentives that are particularly focused on funding research rather
than personal wealth. 279
Note that this solution is not a government buyout or a direct
reward program, as is often suggested, most recently for the
American market by Senator Bernie Sanders. 280 Here, as opposed
to a pure reward system wherein the government provides financial
incentives and an honorary prize in exchange for placing the
innovation in the public domain, this system retains the bulk of the

277

DANIEL S. GREENBERG, SCIENCE FOR SALE: THE PERILS, REWARDS AND DELUSIONS
CAMPUS CAPITALISM 17, 23 (2007) (“The average laboratory scientist . . . is an
unlikely exemplar of personal wealth, capitalistic instincts, or sumptuous living . . . .
Moneymaking has never ranked high as a motivation for the scientific career . . . .
[A]cademic science is one of the least remunerative and most uncertain career choices on
the professional landscape.”).
278
Id. at 12.
279
Many researchers find the insufficiency of rewards to be a barrier to technology
transfer from universities to industry. See Donald Siegel, David Waldman, Leanne
Atwater & Albert Link, Commercial Knowledge Transfers from Universities to Firms:
Improving the Effectiveness of University-Industry Collaboration, 14 J. HIGH TECH.
MGMT. RES. 111, 118 (2003).
280
See, e.g., S. 2210, 109th Cong. (2007); H.R. 417, 109th Cong. (2007) (proposing
along with Senate Bill 2210 to provide incentives for investment in research and
development for new medicines, to enhance access to new medicines, and for other
purposes). Other similar prize proposals have been suggested recently by Senators
Lindsey Graham, John Edwards and Speaker Newt Gingrich. See Press Release, Graham
Introduces H-Prize Legislation in the U.S. Senate (Jan. 24, 2007),
http://schotlinepress.wordpress.com/2007/01/25/graham-introduces-h-prize-legislationin-the-us-senate/; John Edwards, Making Health Care Affordable, Accountable, And
Universal, Jun. 14, 2007, http://www.johnedwards.com/news/headlines/20070614-healthcare-costs-quality.pdf; William Saletan, An Inconvenient Newt: Newt Gingrich,
Environmentalist, SLATE, Oct. 30, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2176957.
OF
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typical intellectual property rights-based patent system. 281 This is
integral. Patents, in addition to providing direct incentives to the
innovator, also provide other social goods. These include
facilitating coordination among the actors in a particular
technological field by providing a map of the current state of the
field and dissemination of technology.
This section will present each component of the proposed
solution. It will attempt to succinctly outline how each element in
the system would work and raise some of the potential problems
associated with each module.
A. Centralized Technology Transfer Office
Many of the bottlenecks in the commercialization of academic
science and innovation research are, ironically, created by the
Bayh-Dole Act and other similar legislation initially designed to
promote innovation. In particular, as stated earlier in this Article, a
major consequence of the legislation—the ubiquitous university
technology transfer office—is a continual impediment. 282 It is
suggested that these holdups could be alleviated through the
creation of a new, alternative system to promote the
commercialization of basic science research.
In this proposed system, a national or regional centralized
technology transfer office—with the express goal of
commercializing research—would be established. In the U.S., the
National Institutes of Health or the National Science Foundation
would be optimal choices to accommodate such an office, although
a private government-sponsored enterprise (“GSE”) could also be
set up to specifically accomplish these goals. 283
281

See Michael Polanvyi, Patent Reform, 11 REV. ECON. STUD. 61, 65 (1943); Brian
Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes and Research Contracts,
73 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 694 (1983).
282
See Gewin, supra note 247, at 948 (“[S]ome critics of the system contend that the
Bayh-Dole Act, which virtually gave birth to the [U.S.] biotechnology industry, may now
be strangling it, as universities seek patent protection on nearly everything . . . . People
are beginning to question whether we’re using the right model.”).
283
“These enterprises were established and chartered by the Federal Government for
public policy purposes. They are not included in the Federal Budget because they are
private companies, and their securities are not backed by the full faith and credit of the
Federal Government.” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
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While merging football teams with another university may be a
hard sell, it may make economic and policy sense to merge
technology transfer offices among different universities and
colleges, creating larger, more objective regional offices. Like
football, technology transfer offices serve the school spirit, and,
thus, the offices may feel obligated to comb every invention
disclosure to find the Next Big Patent, raising the morale of the
school and contributing to the school’s coffers. Yet, individual
offices lack the funds and manpower to thoroughly assess all
invention disclosures. 284 Nevertheless, individual offices often
feel a need to justify their existence given a generally poor track
record and, thus, aggressively attempt to garner as many
disclosures as possible.
A regional licensing office may be able to deal with many of
these issues. Not serving any one particular school, the licensing
professionals may be able to be more objective in their assessments
of a patent’s value. Regional offices do not have a greater need to
justify their existence, serving numerous schools. Regional offices
will also have more licensing clout, giving them the ability to
license better deals from and for academia. Regional offices may
have less incentive to be creative on their MTAs; representing a
vast array of schools, they may have to be more standardized in
their approach. Regional offices will be more capable of allocating
their resources towards finding and patenting marketable
inventions. Regional offices, potentially with a more established
hierarchical structure than a small office in a single university, may
be less likely to pay for patent applications on worthless or
unmarketable inventions, as decisions will probably have to be
vetted through more individuals. Regional offices will be better
suited to hire more professional and better qualified personnel and
provide better services. 285

GOVERNMENT: FY 2006 at 1245 (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
budget/fy2006/pdf/appendix/gov.pdf.
284
Owen-Smith & Powell, supra note 195, at 99.
285
Regional technology transfer offices could be networked in a similar fashion to the
Federal Laboratory Consortium network for government laboratories. See Federal
Laboratory Consortium for Technology Transfer—About, http://www.federallabs.org/
home/about (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
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Although regional offices, with their broad views, may miss
some licensable technologies, scientists will still continue to
publish their research, thus making sure that even those missed
innovations still become part of the scientific record.
Depending on the size and infrastructure of a particular
country, such an agency/office could have either a singular, central
well-staffed office or multiple regional offices. Unaffiliated with
any particular university and responsible primarily to the
government and the regional population, this type of technology
transfer office may be less inclined to simply aspire to blockbuster
licensing deals.
Alternatively, an agency could be set up in the model of the
U.S. Federal Reserve, with long-term appointments of technocrats
who would preside over a system of regional offices. Like the
Federal Reserve, the system of regional technology transfer offices
could be designed to be independent of the government, meeting
its operating expenses primarily from its own business. The
independent nature of the technology transfer system is important.
With the possibility that the patenting and licensing of some
academic innovations might become politically contentious,
particularly in hotly debated areas such as cloning or genetic
enhancement, there may be concerns that the patenting and
licensing of innovations will be directed by immediate policy
concerns rather than a desire to promote science and innovation.
Independent of the exact structure of the office, what is integral
is that the office be designed such that it has the infrastructure,
informatics, and incentives to effectively and efficiently
commercialize academic innovation.
1. Funds
These technology transfer offices might be supported fully or
partially with public funding. The State of Oregon has recently
introduced legislation providing a sixty percent tax credit—which,
as opposed to a tax deduction, reduces the overall amount of tax
owed—to taxpayers who donate to technology transfer offices. 286
286

See Press Release, Oregon University System, Oregon Introduces Unique 60% Tax
Credit to Donors Supporting Commercialization of University Research (Oct. 4, 2007),
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Alternatively, these centralized agencies could bundle, package,
and sell off what essentially amounts to the each scientist’s risk as
complex financial instruments to institutional investors—patent
license-backed securities. These instruments, bundled as assetbacked securities, have a potential future, but often predictable
cash flows from licensing fees would be sold to institutional
investors on the same or similar secondary markets that deal in
mortgages or insurance policies, providing a continual flow of
funds back into the central office for operating expenses.
Government subsidies or a direct line of credit with the
government could make up any shortfalls. Further, like Fannie
Mae (the Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac
(the Federal Home Mortgage Corporation), such an institution
could be exempted from taxes and from the expensive process of
registering the securities that they would sell. Although Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac securities are not guaranteed by the full faith
and credit of the United States government, the central licensing
offices might be, incentivizing wary investors.
2. Particular Strengths of a Large Centralized Office
Larger regional offices are more likely to have the funds to hire
the necessary staff to deal with the needs of both scientists and
businesses and to write consistently strong and sensible patents. 287
The impact of a skilled staff in a technology transfer office cannot
be underestimated. 288 There is some research to suggest that a
available at http://www.ous.edu/news_and_information/news/100407.php (“A 60 percent
income tax credit is now available to Oregon taxpayers who contribute to a new program
designed to fast-track commercialization of research discoveries at Oregon’s eight public
universities . . . . No other state has a program where donors can receive such a generous
tax credit in return for helping move research from lab to market . . . This is an important
link in moving innovation to new companies and jobs for Oregon.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
287
See Grose, supra note 15, at 22 (“Schools and companies at times wrangle over
control of the patent-filing process. . . . [Stanley] Williams [director of HP Quantum
Science Research] is critical of the way universities sometimes handle patent
applications, saying that they’re often too provisional and don’t contain carefully crafted
claims sections . . . and they are often too weak to defend . . . .”).
288
See Heher, supra note 7, at 221; see also Siegel et al., supra note 279 (noting that
many in industry find that technology transfer offices have poor marketing, technical, and
negotiating skills).
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well-staffed technology transfer office could substantially increase
returns on innovation. This is of particular interest to small
American institutions and to institutions in developing nations that
may not have the funding to fully realize the increased return on
investment that comes from having a professionally-staffed
technology transfer office. Further, several studies have shown
that long term trust relationships between technology transfer
officers and industry are integral for initiating and facilitating
knowledge and technology transfer: “a high level of social capital
can significantly reduce transaction and monitoring costs.” 289
A centralized agency can also deal with a common problem in
IP licensing: Often a single commercial product will require the
licensing of numerous patents—often owned by multiple inventors.
With every research institution independently demanding their fair
share of the revenues for their particular licensed innovation, it
quickly becomes unfeasible to commercialize the product;
revenues are overwhelmed by licensing fees. 290 A central
licensing agency might effectively alleviate the problem by
bundling the licenses and providing them for significantly less than
licensing each patent individually. Transaction costs would also be
minimized, as the licensee would negotiate with and be responsible
only to the centralized agency and the multiple individual
licensors. Bundling may also provide distribution for unknown
and untapped patents. Creating a marketable product, industry
licensees may also be incentivized to purchase somewhat
tangential patents that they otherwise would have overlooked.
3. Potential and Perceived Problems with the Proposed
System of Centralized Offices
A centralized and government-run agency may not be trusted
in a developing nation context where corruption might be rampant

289

Anna Nilsson, Henrik Friden & Sylvia Schwagg Serger, Commericalization of Life
Science Research at Universities in the United States, Japan and China, SWEDISH INST.
FOR GROWTH POL’Y STUD., at 17.
290
See, e.g., Gewin supra note 247, at 948 (“[I]f a product requires dozens of patents,
for example, and each university wants 5% of the profits, it soon becomes unfeasible to
do the work . . . .”).
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or unpredictable. 291 In these instances, an international nongovernmental organization (“NGO”) could serve as the central
clearinghouse for a particular country or an entire geographic
region. Such an NGO might also have international clout and
respect that it could exploit to promote the catalog of licensable
innovation. Having an international body run a portion of the
patenting and innovation process in a developing nation is not that
novel. Many countries already look to regional intellectual
property offices to patent and copyright their innovation. 292 It
would not be a stretch to have a regional administration licensing
out patents.
Convincing universities to farm out these offices and dismantle
current in-house services might be a hard sell. Many universities
in both developed and developing nations may be unwilling to lose
their current technology transfer offices, optimistic that their office
can still produce some blockbuster innovation and licensing deal.
Further, universities might note the difficulties that local
technology transfer offices have in just keeping up with local
university innovation on campus. Keeping up with a number of
universities may be nearly impossible.
With these concerns in mind it may be advantageous to
maintain small technology transfer offices in many of the larger
universities. These offices will have two primary purposes: to
license in technology for the benefit of university researchers, and
to evaluate early stage research to: (a) determine whether at the
current stage it ought to be patented, or if it requires more research
to make it a viable licensable technology; and (b) to potentially

291

See, e.g., Julien Penin, Patents Versus Ex Post Rewards: A New Look, 34 RES. POL’Y
641, 644–45 (2005) (noting that corruption and collusion are not limited to developing
nations). Scholars have posited that alternatives to the current patent system, including
ex post rewards and government buyouts of intellectual property, also present issues
relating to collusion between innovators and the agency buying out or rewarding the
inventor and a fear that the government will not pay out the committed reward or price.
Id.
292
Such offices include: OAPI, the African Intellectual Property Organization; ARIPO,
African Regional Intellectual Property Organization; BOIP, Benelux Office for
Intellectual Property; EPO, The European Patent Organisation; The GCC Patent Office,
The Patent Office of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf.
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write many of the university’s patents that would then be passed on
to the centralized agency for licensing.
In these instances, the technology transfer would be
repositioned as a university core facility.
Many research
institutions already have multiple core facilities, i.e., central
research tools such as microarray facilities, 293 culture
laboratories, 294 light and electron microscopes 295 or proteomic
facilities, that are equally used and supported by multiple
departments. The technology transfer office would be a similar
central tool. Arguably it may be fairer to support the universitywide tool with a slice of the patent royalties. Nevertheless, there
remain justifiable concerns that granting the office any monetary
stake in the revenue might lead to the same problems and conflicts
that American TTOs currently face.
To further incentivize universities to use a centralized agency,
the national patent office could consider relaxing patent rules and
fees when filing through the centralized technology transfer office.
For example, recent USPTO regulations limit the number of claims
in a filing to twenty-five total, with a maximum of five
independent claims. 296 The USPTO could potentially relax these
restrictive rules when a university patents and licenses through a
central technology transfer office.
Universities might be granted a small percentage of the
licensing fees generated by the patent. These fees could be used
toward administrative or infrastructure costs, or could provide
293

See, e.g., Yale WM Keck Foundation DNA Microarray Resource in the School of
Medicine, http://keck.med.yale.edu/microarrays (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
294
See, e.g., Cell Culture Core Facility at the Yeshiva University Albert Einstein
College of Medicine, http://www.aecom.yu.edu/home/hgp/cell_culture.htm (last visited
Jan. 30, 2009).
295
See, e.g., Light Microscopy Core Facility at Duke University, http://microscopy.
duke.edu (last visited Jan. 30, 2009); Confocal & Electron Microscopy Core Facility
Laboratory at Princeton, http://www.molbio1.princeton.edu/facility/confocal (last visited
Jan. 30, 2009).
296
See David Schwartz, Patent Costs, Paperwork to Spiral Under ‘Complex’ New
USTPO Rules, TECH. TRANSFER TACTICS, 86, Oct. 17, 2007, available at
http://www.technologytransfertactics.com/content/2007/10/17/patent-costs-paperworkspiral-under-complex-new-ustpo-rules.
The new rules, characterized by the
Commissioner for Patents John Doll as extensive and complex, will also restrict
applicants to two continuations and only one request for a continued examination.
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additional funding for those researchers that do not produce
patentable innovations.
With the centralized office owning the patent and licensing at a
relatively low flat rate there may be no incentive, if and when the
time ever arises, to litigate a patent infringement case. And, with
no potential enforcement by the owner of the IP, potential
licensees may see no incentive to ever license the patent; infringing
at will. Another concern related to the nature of the centralized
office’s ownership is relevant to the quality of the patent. With the
responsibility to prosecute so many patents, and without any profit
motive, the centralized agency lacks the incentives to create high
quality patents that will stand up in litigation. Not only would
such a situation quickly bankrupt the system, but it could have a
potentially catastrophic effect on a fledgling patent regime if it
were to be implemented in a developing nation, by degrading the
strength and validity of patents in general. A possible solution to
this potential problem could be to include, in the flat license, a
clause requiring each licensee to pay into a legal defense fund to
protect the patent should it ever be infringed. Although data is not
available for most nations, data for the U.S. patent system, known
to be highly litigious, indicates an overall low rate of litigation.
Justice Kimberly Moore counted, for instance, only 4500 patents
litigated out of a total of 180,000 patents granted that same
year. 297 With only 2.5% of all patents litigated, chances are
relatively slim that the licensee’s particular patent will be litigated,
making such a clause more amenable to the licensee.
A centralized system where the inventor is quickly bought out
and divorced from the potential patent may result in researchers
who, for lack of any incentives, become unhelpful in the
prosecution phase of the patent. In these situations, it may be
helpful to dock, or threaten to dock those researchers’ grants on
future patents.
B. Grant Payment System
Research scientists could be incentivized into using the
centralized agency through a grant-like system. In this system,
297

Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1521 (2005).

VOL19_BOOK2_GREENBAUM

2009]

2/26/2009 3:47:32 AM

ACADEMIA TO INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

389

researchers would have the option to exchange their intellectual
property rights for a grant-like transfer payment, assessed relative
to the value of their innovation. The centralized agency would, in
effect, be buying the inventor's risk related to her future royalty
streams.
Alternatively, researchers could hold on to the
intellectual property themselves.
The volume of innovation in all countries has been shown to
be directly proportional to the investment in research. 298 Thus,
particularly in developing nations where funding is limited, this
grant system provides an important feedback loop in developing
innovative technologies. In this grant system, innovative research
begets guarantees of further funding and investment in research—
further promoting innovation.
Note, however, that as a
prerequisite to this system, the intellectual property rights to the
invention must belong solely to the inventor and not to the
university.
Under the current Bayh-Dole regime in the United States,
academic scientists often have to be prompted and cajoled by
technology transfer officers to cooperate in commodifying their
discoveries. 299 Many if not most scientists seem to have no
interest in going through the relatively tedious patent prosecution
process. 300 More often than not, faculty are more interested in
funding their research through industry collaborations rather than
securing entrepreneurial opportunities for their universities and
themselves. 301 There are often more profitable and less irritating
ways, albeit not as beneficial to society, to profit from academic

298

Heher, supra note 7, at 218.
Possibly recognizing the problems associated with having technology transfer
officers badgering researchers for their latest developments, Austria’s implementation of
the technology transfer office requires the researcher to contact the technology transfer
officer and not vice versa. See, e.g., Graz University of Technology, Service for Inventors
at Graz University of Technology: Technology Exploitation Office Celebrates its Success,
Aug. 27, 2007, http://portal.tugraz.at/pls/portal/docs/page/Files/FTH/fth_tv/files/07_08_
29_Presseaussendung_TUG_vs3_e.pdf.
300
A university’s success in patenting innovations has been tied to the faculty’s
perception of the benefits in patenting. See Owen-Smith & Walter Powell, supra note
195, at 105.
301
See Yong S. Lee, The Sustainability Of University-Industry Research
Collaborations: An Empirical Assessment, 25 J. TECH. TRANSFER 111, 121 (2000).
299
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technology transfer, e.g., through consulting. 302 Recent research
further suggests that academics only tend to be entrepreneurial
about their innovations after the product has begun the
commercialization process and remain mostly uninterested until
that threshold time.
Many faculty members, particularly in developing nations
where a patent culture is not yet as pervasive as it is in developed
Western societies, may not share the same Western drive for a
blockbuster licensing deal. This proposed regime would help to
overcome that initial inertia by creating a more practical and
Mertonian incentive (many academics in developing nations still
officially subscribe to these classical ideals). Academics can be
further enticed by the prospect of contributing directly to society
through the transfer of technology and then, once licensed, their
innovation would give the researcher access to the relevant
industries and their assets for further investigations. 303
Nonetheless, even with the grant component of this system,
there still needs to be an active educational component directed at
researchers, promoting the many positive features and assuaging
the fears associated with technology transfer and patents in
general. 304 A strong educational module is necessary to make the
system work and universities need to be proactive in informing
researchers as to the importance and benefits of technology
transfer. 305
Granting a researcher immediate cash instead of a future
undefined royalty rate would also alleviate the issue commonly
found throughout the lateral academic hiring process. Under
302

William Bains, How Academics Can Make (Extra) Money Out of Their Science, 11
J. COM. BIOTECHNOLOGY 353, 353 (2005). Dissatisfaction with university technology
transfer offices have also led academics to circumvent that method of technology transfer
in favor of consulting. See, e.g., Owen-Smith & Powell, supra note 195, at 104.
303
See Elizabeth R.J Bell, Some Current Issues in Technology Transfer and AcademicIndustrial Relations: A Review, 5 TECH. ANALYSIS & STRATEGIC MGMT 307, 308 (1993).
304
A recent study found that a lack of understanding regarding industry norms plays a
large part in creating a barrier to academic technology transfer. See Siegel et al., supra
note 279, 119–20.
305
See, e.g., Mauri Laukkanen, Exploring Academic Entrepreneurship: Drivers and
Tensions of University-Based Business, 10 J. SMALL BUS. & ENTERPRISE DEV. 372, 375
(2003) (noting the typical dysfunctional business attitudes of faculty).
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Bayh-Dole and similar regimes, the university retains title to the
invention and, as such, may threaten to withhold future royalty
payments to those researchers who leave the institution. This
impediment to academic mobility could potentially have a
devastating impact on the transfer of knowledge, particularly in a
developing nation.
1. Concerns with the Grant System
The grant system does create some potential concerns: By
creating a real and valuable incentive 306 —grant credits with
minimal restrictions in exchange for handing over the licensing
process to a centralized agency—academic researchers might be
even too aggressive in trying to patent their discoveries. Further
concerns include the reality that universities, faced with the loss of
their potential golden egg, will lobby heavily against such a
system. In the United States, the bulk of the royalties brought in
by patents go to the university with typically only a small
portion—at the university’s discretion—going to the actual
inventor.
In the absence of any current norms in developing nations,
there may be initial levels of distrust among researchers and their
institutions in divvying up the spoils of a license or in deciding
who holds IP rights. With a centralized agency holding the rights,
and the grant credits going directly to the researcher, this no longer
becomes as significant a concern.
Further, grant money may fail to incentivize those researchers
who feel that their particular innovation is worth much more than
the credits offered. In those situations, the system should allow
researchers the opportunity to hold on to the intellectual property
rights instead of transferring them for grant credits. In situations
where the researcher thinks that her particular discovery is worth
306

Greater rewards for faculty involvement in technology transfer are directly related to
enhancing a university’s technology transfer capabilities. See J. Friedman & J. Silberman,
University Technology Transfer: Do Incentives, Management, and Location Matter?, 28
J. TECH. TRANSFER 17, 17 (2003); see also Magnus Henrekson & Nathan Rosenberg,
Designing Efficient Institutions for Science-Based Entrepreneurship: Lesson from the US
and Sweden, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 207, 207 (2001) (calling for stronger individual
incentives in technology transfer).
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her entrepreneurial skills in either starting up a company or
marketing it herself, the most valuable discoveries will be
aggressively brought to the marketplace by those who know the
research best. 307 Technology transfer officers, in a recent survey,
estimated that up to 71% of all licensed innovation could not be
successfully commercialized without ongoing collaboration with
the original researchers. 308
Here it is important for local
technology transfer offices to promote this entrepreneurial spirit:
“there is strong evidence that the entrepreneurial culture resulting
from the focus on technology transfer results in many other
benefits which can neither be captured nor measured by the
institution but which have an impact on the local economy.” 309
C. Early IP Valuation
The proposed grant incentive system is predicated on the
ability to efficiently ascertain whether the nascent innovation
meets or exceeds the threshold patentability requirements set by
the local patent offices. And, more importantly, the system also
needs to be able to effectively determine the current and potential
value of the invention such that the grant payout neither over or
under incentivizes, but rather provides the optimal level of
incentivization both for the inventor and for society.

307

Inventor cooperation and involvement is often crucial for commercial development.
It is precisely the most profitable (and, possibly, important) innovations where this
system would promote researchers to stay involved and cooperate with the licensor. See,
e.g., Richard Jensen & Marie C. Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing
of University Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 240, 240–41 (2001); see also Brian Harmon
et al., Mapping the University Technology Transfer Process, 12 J. BUS. VENTURING 423,
423–34 (1997) (noting the importance of strong connections in the technology transfer
process). Note that studies have shown a number of entrepreneurial skills and proclivities
in basic science researchers. See, e.g., Karen Seashore Louis, David. Blumenthal,
Michael E. Gluck & Michael A. Soto, Entrepreneurs in Academe: An Exploration of
Behaviors Among Life Scientists, 34 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 110, 110 (1989).
308
Jerry Thrusby & Marie Thursby, Pros and Cons of Faculty Participation in
University Licensing Introducing Technology Entrepreneurship to Graduate Education:
An Integrative Approach, in 16 UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 193 (2005).
309
Heher, supra note 7, at 218–19.
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As opposed to the relatively straightforward patent situation
where the inventor’s reward from licensing or selling the patent
herself is directly correlated to the “invention’s being found useful,
. . . the greater the usefulness the greater the reward . . . ,” 310 this
ex ante grant incentive needs to create some other fair, transparent,
consistent, and reliable method of evaluating IP value at a
relatively early stage in the life of the invention in order to
establish a similarly incentivizing method.
There are legitimate concerns regarding the ability of any
organization to fairly, and cost-effectively evaluate a patent in its
earliest stages. Patent values are highly heterogeneous and are
controlled by a myriad of factors. Determining and reducing a
patent’s valuation to a single one time payout is non-trivial. Even
the current systems for IP valuation, often determining the value of
the intellectual property well into the life of the invention, have
been described as inappropriate, unreliable, or a series of
guestimates. 311 Most banks will not use intellectual property as
collateral for these very reasons. 312 But, given the time lag
between the initial patentable research and commercialization, it
would be impossible to properly incentivize researchers who may
need to wait a decade or more before the grant value can be
determined.
Notwithstanding the computational difficulties inherent in the
early determination of a patent’s value, there are a number of webbased services that provide tools for IP current valuation and
projected revenues. 313 Further, most university innovations are
310

JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR
APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 933 (Sir W.J. Ashley ed., 1936) (1849).
311
Shigeki Kamiyama, Jerry Sheehan & Catalina Martinez, Valuation And Exploitation
Of Intellectual Property 26 (The OECD Directorate for Science, Technology, Working
Paper, 2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/working-papers.
312
Id. at 23.
313
See, e.g., Jiang-Liang Hou, Hseu Yen Lin & Cheng-Chuang Hon, A Web-Based
Platform for IP Valuation and Trading, Presented at the 35th International Conference on
Computers and Industrial Engineering (2005), http://www.umoncton.ca/cie/Conferences/
35thconf/CIE35%20Proceedings/PDF/040.pdf; see also RoyaltySource, http://www.
royaltysource.com; RoyaltyStat, http://www.royaltystat.com (containing “a subscription
database of royalty rates and license agreements compiled from the US Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Edgar Archive”). “In RoyaltyStat you can find
comparable royalty rates for valuing (or licensing) intangible assets . . . [useful in]
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licensed before they are even patented, suggesting that universities
are already successfully engaged in early stage, pre-patent
valuations on much of their innovations. 314
1. Strategies for Early IP Evaluation
Early stage IP valuation can be accomplished through a
number of procedures. 315 The two cost methods look to either
production or replacement costs in determining the value of the
IP. 316 Production costs are equal to the cost to invent and patent
added to the desired profit margin. The replacement method
evaluates the cost to produce a similar invention with similar
utility. These methods are particularly useful for early stage
technology or where there is no data on similar inventions that can
be used as a comparison. Nonetheless, critics of the cost method
claim that it fails to assess any real measure of value to either the
owner or the potential purchaser of the patent and fails to consider
any potential future markets; no projected revenue or profit data is
taken into account.
The market method looks to comparable patents and their
relevant historical sales data. Uniqueness of individual patents

[f]inding reasonable or comparable royalty rates; [or] Valuing intangible property for
mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, bankruptcy, or other transactions.” Id.; SparkIP,
http://sparkip.com.
314
Daniel Elfenbein, Publications, Patents, and the Market for University Inventions,
63 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 688, 693 (2007).
315
Methods are said to borrow from quantum physics, statistics, mechanics, ballistics,
climatology and game theory. The Association of University Technology Managers
provides some spreadsheets to help technology transfer officers determine the value of a
patent. Factors listed by AUTM that affect valuation include: the potential market; how
well the technology fits with the licensee in terms of technology, markets served,
manufacturing capabilities, and distribution channels; whether the proposed products
open up new markets for the licensee or eat into current markets of the licensee; how far
along the development of the technology is—already scaled-up and tested working units,
working prototype, proof of concept, analytical work; the benefits of the technology vs.
the current technology within the intended markets; the strength and enforceability of the
patent protection; the margins that the industry and the technology can command; the
cost savings for manufacture and distribution over current technologies; who will derive
value; and follow on opportunities and multiple fields of use. See Valuate2000 &
ValBio2000, at 2 (Dec. 1, 2000), http://www.autm.net/aboutTT/ValManual.pdf.
316
David Drews, The Cost Approach to IP Valuation: Its Uses and Limitations,
IPMETRICS, Jan. 12, 2001, at 1, http://www.ipmetrics.cc/Cost%20Approach.PDF.
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makes this method speculative, at best. The method is useful only
within a narrow range of patents. A proper evaluation using the
market method requires an active market with sufficient publiclyavailable data on a sufficient number of exchanges of a similar
patent. Overall, the market method is often thought to be a poor
choice for IP evaluation, particularly given that individual
negotiations for IP are often motivated by unknowable and unique
strategic conditions that are reflected in the price.317
Other methods include the Industry Standards method, derived
from Market Method, which looks to royalty rates in similar past
transactions, and the Options Method which is based on the BlackScholes formula for valuing stock options. The Options Method
evaluates the patent/innovation through five variables, many
particularly applicable to early stage research typical of an
academic environment. Here the IP investment is viewed as “an
option to develop the IP further or to abandon it depending on
future technology and market information.” 318 Relevant factors
include: (a) a determination of the remaining development cost to
commercialize the innovation; (b) the average market value of
similar patents; (c) time until commercial utilization; (d) product
value volatility; (e) risk-free rate of return; and (f) remaining time
until the patent expiration date. 319
2. Elements of a Proposed Early Evaluation System
Simplistically, however one could also imagine a more
straightforward, fair and accurate approach to evaluating the
intellectual property presented to the centralized technology
transfer office, than those suggested above. Such a system would
be a multistage process. The initial evaluation would be to
determine, broadly, whether the proposed innovation is

317

See, e.g., W.H. Davidson & Donald G. McFetridge, Key Characteristics in the
Choice of International Technology Transfer Mode, 16 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 5, 18–19
(1985) (discussing the importance of the business status of the licensee and licensor
parties in the pricing of IP).
318
Ron Laurie, IP Valuation: Magic or Myth?, Presented at the Intellectual Property
Issues in M&A Transactions (Apr. 29, 2004), available at http://www.ipstrategy.com/downloads/IP_Society_IP_Valuation.pdf.
319
Id.
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patentable—not a trivial decision. Here, an unsophisticated onepage form would provide a concise abstract of the invention, other
similar patented or published research, and short answers speaking
to the novelty, utility, and non-obviousness of the invention. The
inventor’s involvement in this procedure is imperative, as the
information required at this stage is typically known best to the
inventor. At this early stage, questions as to the feasibility of mass
production or marketability are not relevant and, most importantly
for the scientists involved, time spent on patenting innovations is
time spent away from research. The faster and easier this process
is, the more likely more researchers will get involved.
Typically, a vast majority of putative patents will fail at this
initial patentability threshold. 320 Patent prosecutors would also
determine whether a patent should be filed domestically, and
internationally as well. Depending on the particular nature of the
research, the costs associated with international filings may not be
necessary, or justifiable.
For those patents that survive the first phase, the next level will
then look to provide a basic valuation of the invention. This stage
should be perceived to be as objective as possible, to prevent
researchers from becoming disincentivized by what may be seen as
an unfair or corrupt evaluation. Although pertinent to the
discussion, the exact parameters of such an evaluation, which
would probably include the maturity of the innovation and its field
and the innovation’s market, the degree of innovation in the
invention and the general background on the specific field, are
beyond the skills of the author, necessitating significantly further
research into the subject matter.
It may also be helpful to consider the usage of a peer reviewing
team. Often it is the scientists themselves that have the clearest
vantage point as to the overall direction of any particular
technology. The peer-reviewers could themselves be incentivized
to participate through much smaller grant transfers. Peer-to-peer
analysis of patents is not a novel idea and is currently in use on a

320

GREENBERG, supra note 277, at 24.
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trial basis. 321 Patent evaluation could also be automated based on
a number of important and standardized criteria. 322
This evaluation process would also require an arbitration panel
to deal with those scientists who disagree with the evaluation of
their research, although the use of such a panel should be
discouraged, given the resources and time needed to appeal.
Grants directly related to the evaluation of the innovation
would then be provided to the researcher. These grants would be
similar to a government or NGO grant for scientific research,
although, unlike most grants, they should have no strings attached
to further incentivize researchers to present their research to the
technology transfer personnel.
The final stage of the credit evaluation would take place a few
years later. Here, scientists could opt to have their innovation
reevaluated based on licensing data or technological changes that
would increase the value of their invention. Researchers would be
credited for the increase in the value of their invention but would
not be penalized for a fall in value.
D. Flat Rate Licensing
American technology transfer offices are hampered not only
by the bureaucracy involved in Bayh-Dole compliance, but by the
transaction costs associated with licensing of academic research.
A centralized agency may be more inclined to create a flat
licensing system akin to IBM standard patent licenses, or
Stanford’s standard licensing scheme on the Cohen-Boyer
patent. 323 The creation of a flat licensing scheme, in effect, would
emulate the compensatory liability regime (“CLR”) 324 proposed by
321

See Peer to Patent Project, http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/signup.htm (last
visited Jan. 30, 2009).
322
Jiang-Liang Hou & Hsiu-Yan Lin, A Multiple Regression Model for Patent
Appraisal, 106 INDUS. MGMT. & DATA SYS. 1304, 1305 (2006).
323
For a review of the licensing strategy, see, for example, Maryann Feldman,
Alessandra Colaianni & Kang Liu, Commercializing Cohen-Boyer 1980–1997, at 24–26
(Danish Research Unit for Indus. Dynamics, Druid Working Paper No. 05-21, 2005),
http://www.druid.dk/wp/pdf_files/Feldman_Colaianni_Liu.pdf.
324
TRACY LEWIS & J. H. REICHMAN, USING LIABILITY RULES TO STIMULATE LOCAL
INNOVATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A LAW AND ECONOMICS PRIMER, PREPARED FOR
THE CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
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Professors Reichman and Lewis as an alternative to a utility patent,
creating a patent-like system based on liability rather than property
rules. 325
Professors Reichman and Lewis note how such a system would
be particularly useful to a developing nation. 326 This system
would alleviate the hassle and costs of negotiating and licensing
each individual patent, issues that often lead to breakdowns in
negotiations, 327 and the subsequent failure to commercialize an
invention. 328 This initial forgoing of the significant profits present
in some licensing deals is not a novel proposal. Some universities
already waive license fees in an effort to create interest in their

UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 12 (2003), available at
http://www.earth.columbia.edu/cgsd/documents/lewisreichman.pdf
325
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (based on
Calebresi and Melamed’s distinction between liability and property rules).
326
See LEWIS & REICHMAN, supra note 324.
327
Wayne Johnson, Changing Interfaces Between the Research University and
Industry, Presentation at the Engineering Research Council Workshop and Forum, at 16
(Feb. 27, 2005), http://www.asee.org/asee/conferences/erc/2005/upload/wayne-cjohnson.ppt.
Typically at present, negotiating a contract to perform collaborative
research with an American university takes one to two years of
exchanging emails by attorneys, punctuated by long telephone
conference calls involving the scientists who wish to work together.
All too often, the company spends more on attorneys’ fees than the
value of the contract being negotiated. This situation has driven
many large companies away from working with American
universities altogether, and they are looking for alternate research
partners.
Id. (quoting Stan Williams, Director, HP Quantum Science Research).
328
See Gewin, supra note 247, at 949.
At the same time, industry is tiring of disputes over intellectual
property and, in some cases, withdrawing from collaboration with
universities . . . . “Fewer and fewer companies want to work with
universities on sponsored research because they feel it doesn’t make
good business sense” . . . . “Companies could disadvantage themselves if it produces inventions that they are ultimately unable to
license,” she adds. Industry analysts point out that the growth in the
flow of industry research dollars into universities has slowed and
become more volatile in the past five years.
Id. (quoting Susan Butts, External Technology Director at the Dow Chemical Company).
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research and promote relationships with industry 329 —indicating a
realization that complex and time-consuming negotiations may do
more to hamper technology transfer between universities and
industry, than they help.
The flat rate component of the proposed system would also
promote many of the researchers’ goals. Exclusive licensing may
inhibit basic research at an academic level—universities are
typically risk averse in many arenas and, with an exclusive license
tying up a portion of a technological field, researchers may be
unable to pursue investigations in those particular areas. Under a
non-exclusive licensing plan, researchers can obtain a patent on
their innovation without the fear that the patent will limit the
usefulness and availability of that invention to other academics and
the public at large. And, with patents increasingly becoming more
popular in academia and even being used as a factor in tenure
decisions, 330 it is likely that there will be a continued and strong
interest in the patenting of research.
University interests would also be served by a flat-rate license.
The resultant minimal level of negotiations would simplify and,
importantly, speed up the commercialization of research. 331
Licensing “delays [are] antithetical to the fast product turnaround
demands that many companies labor under in today’s world.”332
Further, “even modest transaction costs—like the costs of hiring
lawyers to write up a licensing contract, or the value of the time

329

See, e.g., UNMC Program Waives Research Licensing Fees, OMAHA WORLD
HERALD, Aug. 25, 2007, available at http://www.omaha.com/index.php?
u_page+1208&u_sid+10115633 (noting the University of Nebraska’s Medical center’s
waiver of upfront fees in return for revenue sharing later on). The University of Ottawa
has a similar program. See Posting of David Schwartz to the Tech Transfer Blog, Will IP
License
Fee
Waivers
Become
a
Trend
in
Tech
Transfer?,
http://www.technologytransfertactics.com/enews/enews952007.htm#3 (Sept. 5, 2007).
330
See, e.g., Sara Lipka, Texas A&M Will Allow Consideration of Faculty Members’
Patents in Tenure Process, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 30, 2006,
http://chronicle.com/daily/2006/05/2006053003n.htm.
331
See Grose, supra note 15 (“Speed is a bigger issue than cost . . . GM says it is easier
to merge one of its units with a company from Japan than to do IP negotiations with an
American university.” (quoting Paul Peercy, Dean of the University of Wisconsin’s
engineering school)).
332
GROSE, supra note 27, at 3.
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required by two parties to negotiate terms—are likely to make it
unprofitable to trade many patented technologies.” 333
Cheaper and simpler flat licensing fees would also make basic
science research available to even regional or state businesses,
often unable to compete with national and multinational companies
that have the infrastructure and the budget to negotiate and license
promising academic research. Bayh-Dole expressly calls for the
promotion of technology transfer to small businesses, although it
provides little in the way of actualizing this goal. A system that
creates an even playing field for all corporations would help
governments achieve their oft-stated objective of promoting small
businesses and startups.
A flat licensing rate will often incentivize the uptake of
relatively non-valuable academic innovation. “All too often, the
company spends more on attorneys’ fees than the value of the
contract being negotiated.” 334 If negotiating a license costs more
than the resulting profit from the innovation, industry is less likely
to be interested enough to pursue commercialization in that area. 335
Additionally, the cost of tracking royalties through product
cycles presents another disincentive to licensing some innovation.
Given those costs, industry will prefer to pay a lump sum licensing
fee as opposed to recurring royalty payments. 336
333

Elfenbein, supra note 314, at 691; see also Johnson, supra note 327.
Given that negotiations with an American university can take more
than a year, the idea is often valueless before an agreement can be
reached, and the company often spends more in legal expenses than it
would be able to pay in royalties. This can lead to a company just
walking away from the negotiation, and declining to sponsor any
further research at that university.
Johnson, supra note 327.
334
Grose, supra note 15, at 20 (quoting R. Stanley Williams, director of HP Quantum
Science Research).
335
Johnson, supra note 327 (“The partnership between industry and universities has
been weakened over difficulties associated with negotiating IP rights in research
contracts in recent times.”).
336
See id.; see also Grose, supra note 15, at 21 (citing Joe O’Brien, University
Relations Program Manager at Hewlett-Packard). “Deborah Kilpatrick, director of new
ventures at Guidant Corp., a California bioengineering firm, agrees. ‘Downstream
royalties give us serious concern in early-stage research and technology development.’ It
is, she explains, very difficult to commit to them so far upstream of any commercial
product.” Grose, supra note 15, at 21.
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In order to make the centralized office independently
economically viable, the revenue received from licensing should
cover the administrative costs, patent office expenses, and the
grant money offered to those innovators that trade in their
intellectual property rights. Licensing fees could be set at a global
flat rate equal to the average cost of prosecuting and paying for the
patent. Alternatively, the system could discriminate, setting flat
rates differently for different technologies and even subsectors of
those technologies—potentially charging more for patents whose
technology sectors happen to be in greater demand or more
profitable.
An alternative to the flat licensing may be a fee tied to the
valuation of the patent plus the average prosecution costs.
Licensees would probably accept such a system provided that the
IP valuation methodology is transparent and conventional.
1. Exclusive Licensing Concerns
Exclusive licenses are often desired by licensees when a
company must invest substantial resources to commercialize
ground-breaking technology. Nonexclusive licensing programs are
used when a new technology is likely to become a standard, is
useful only in conjunction with other pre-existing technology, or is
developed by a company that requires freedom to operate rather
than an exclusive advantage over other companies. 337
A relatively low royalty rate may also alleviate the concern that
without an exclusive license companies may be unwilling to outlay
the costs to develop embryonic research. 338 Arguably, if the cost
to use the innovation is minimal enough, businesses might
nevertheless be willing to take the risk of licensing the technology.
And, with the concern that others may also be licensing the
technology, businesses may be more aggressive and economical in
developing that technology. The flat licensing contract might also
have a sunset provision allowing either side to renegotiate the

337

See ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2006, at
32 (2006).
338
See, e.g., Thursby & Thursby, supra note 267, at 1052.
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license, within certain parameters, once the research has been
shown to be either a success or a dud, commercially.
Nevertheless, there may be legitimate concerns that
transferring back intellectual property into the hands of the
government will revert the system to its pre-Bayh-Dole years when
less than 5% of government patents were licensed to industry. 339 It
has been argued that much of the government’s failure to license
its intellectual property can be traced to the fact that it would not
provide exclusive licenses to companies. 340 These arguments are
not without merit. With the fear that a competitor could be
simultaneously working on the same project, it often did not make
good business sense to go through the hassle of licensing the
innovation.
These fears are probably unfounded. 341 The National Institutes
of Health also has a successful technology transfer system
involving mostly non-exclusive licenses. 342 More than 60% of all
IP licensed out of universities is non-exclusively licensed. 343 The
most recent data from the Licensing Survey by the Association of
University Technology Managers indicates that only 5% of
academic inventions are currently developed into startups, even
with the option for exclusive licensing. 344
Additionally, there are reports of a licensing paradigm shift
away from an earlier emphasis on protection and exclusive
339

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED NO. 98-126, REPORT TO
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES: TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, ADMINISTRATION OF THE BAYHDOLE ACT BY RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES, at 3 (May 7, 1998).
340
See, e.g., Council on Governmental Relations, The Bayh-Dole Act: A Guide To The
Law And Implementing Regulations (1999), available at http://www.ucop.edu/
ott/faculty/bayh.html.
341
See ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2005, at
14 (2006) (“Licensing to small companies dominated total licensing; the majority of all
licenses were non-exclusive.”).
342
See Carla Garnett, Tech Transfer Helps NIH Breakthroughs Break Through, NIH
RECORD, May 5, 2006, http://www.nihrecord.od.nih.gov/newsletters/2006/05_05_2006/
story01htm.
343
See AUTM U.S. LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2005, supra note 341, at 33.
344
Press Release, InnovateTech, Technology Transfer Firm Launches to Create New
Startup Deal Flow Channel for DC Region (Oct. 10, 2007), available at
http://www.prweb.com/pdfdownload/559520/pr.pdf (citing Gerard Eldering, founder and
president of InnovateTech).
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licensing and toward a more realistic goal of airing a simple ‘right
to operate’, i.e., any sort of license. 345 With the fast paced nature
of technology innovation, the right to exclude competitors from a
particular chunk of intellectual property through an exclusive
license is no longer important. A licensee now expects to extract
the value of the license fees from future innovation developed from
the licensed patent, not the actual patented innovation. 346
2. Exclusive License Option
There may, nevertheless, be instances where an exclusive
license is necessary to promote innovation, often in bioengineering
and aerospace sectors. 347 In some instances, then, it may be
worthwhile for the transfer agency to negotiate a more complex
exclusive license with a company.
To prevent the exclusive licensee from impeding academic
research, a clause in the exclusive license would require the
licensee, and any subsequent licenses to the licensee’s follow on
innovation emanating from the original exclusively licensed, to
license back the innovation to academic institutions at a reasonable
rate. These so-called viral contracts are attempts to make
“commitments run with a digital object . . . [thus attaching] the
obligations regarding the content to the content itself, so that
everyone who comes into possession of the content would also
inherit the obligations to the initiator.” 348

345

See Marcia Anderegg, Joshua Thayer & Kathlen Williams, Trendspotting: A Shift in
Intellectual Property Focus, BIOENTREPRENEUR, Apr. 24, 2006, http://www.nature.com/
bioent/building/ip/042006/pf/bioent907_pf.html.
346
Id.
347
See Wendy H. Schacht, The Bayh-Dole Act: Selected Issues in Patent Policy and the
Commercialization of Technology, Congressional Research Service, RL 32076 at CRS-10
(updated Apr. 3, 2008), available at http://www.italy.usembassygov/pdf/other/
RL32076.pdf (“[E]xclusivity is what motivates firms to invest financial and human
resources in technology development. It provides an incentive for universities to take the
time and effort to pursue a patent and to license those patents in its portfolio. This has
led to a significant increase in academic patenting.”).
348
Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers & Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J.
1125, 1132–33 (2000).
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Some intellectual property licenses have already successfully
incorporated a viral aspect, 349 most prominently the GNU General
Public License (“GPL”). 350 Note that instances may arise where
there may be disagreements as to whether a subsequent innovation
is a derivative of the earlier exclusively licensed work or not. Such
disagreements have already occurred in the software industry.
There are also legitimate concerns that viral or infectious terms in
an exclusive license may serve as a disincentive to license, or more
importantly may constitute patent misuse. 351 Finally, licensees
who have an exclusive license with a viral clause may find other
commercial entities unwilling to collaborate or to even license
their patents for a product that is derived from a virally licensed
academic innovation.
E. Anticommons Concerns and Experimental Use Doctrine
This regime would also limit the potential anti-commons
effects thought to be associated with aggressive patenting and

349

See Sapna Kumar, Enforcing The GNU GPL, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 9
(2006); Andrés Guadamuz González, Viral Contracts or Unenforceable Documents?
Contractual Validity of Copyleft Licenses, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 331 (2004),
available at http://opensource.mit.edu/papers/guadamuz.pdf. Note, it is unclear whether
the viral component of a GPL license would actually stand up in an American or even
European court—all cases on point have been settled out of court. Additionally, there are
solid arguments questioning the ability of such a license to withstand the requirements of
contract law—particularly issues such as privity.
350
See GNU General Public License Version 3, http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html
(last visited Jan. 29, 2009).
351
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006).
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of
his having done one or more of the following: . . . (5) conditioned the
license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product
on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase
of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent
owner has market power in the relevant market for the patent or
patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.
Id.; see also Robin Feldman, The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is it Patent
Misuse?, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 118, 118 (2004) (concluding that the patent misuse
doctrine should not apply to so-called open-source biotechnology).
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restrictive licensing, 352 predominantly by changing the nature of
the technology transfer office from an inhibitory gatekeeper to a
facilitator of technology transfer. 353

352

See Michael Heller & Rebecca Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998).
The anticommons refers to a situation wherein “a resource is prone to
under use . . . when multiple owners each have a right to exclude
others from a scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of
use. . . . Transaction costs, strategic behaviors, and cognitive biases
of participants” exacerbates the issue . . . . Once an anticommons
emerges, collecting rights into usable private property is often brutal
and slow.
Id.; see also Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn, The Kept University, ATL. MON., Mar.
2000, at 39.
[T]he National Institutes of Health issued a report to NIH director,
Harold Varmus, warning that changes in the way universities guard
their intellectual property are endangering the free exchange of basic
research tools—such as gene sequences and reagents—that are
crucial to all research. The NIH found that the terms universities
impose on their research tools, through their technology-licensing
offices, ‘present just about every type of clause that universities cite
as problematic in the [contracts] . . . they receive from industry.
Press & Washburn, supra. Note that technology transfer offices themselves are often
found to be too aggressive in exercising their intellectual property rights. See Siegel et al.,
supra note 279.
353
See Hearing on Nanotechnology Before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology and
Space of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 107th Cong. (2002)
(testimony of R. Stanley Williams, HP Fellow, Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, HewlettPackard
Company),
http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/abouthp/government/testimonynanotechnology.pdf.
American Universities have become extremely aggressive in their
attempts to raise funding from large corporations.
Severe
disagreements have arisen because of conflicting interpretations of
the Bayh-Dole act. Large US-based corporations have become so
disheartened and disgusted with the situation they are now working
with foreign universities, especially the elite institutions in France,
Russia and China, which are more than willing to offer extremely
favorable intellectual property terms.
Id.; see also NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH
(NIH) WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS (June 4, 1998), available at
http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/index.htm.
Many scientists and institutions involved in biomedical research are
frustrated by growing difficulties and delays in negotiating the terms
of access to research tools . . . . Over and over again, firms
complained to us that universities “wear the mortarboard” when they
seek access to tools developed by others, yet they impose the same
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Succinctly, anticommons theorists fear that the transaction
costs resulting from a system that over-incentivizes patenting and
allows the control of scarce resources to be balkanized, i.e., too
many individuals exerting the right to exclude others from those
resources, will lead to the underutilization of patented
innovations. 354
One particular anticommons-related issue has been the concern
over the evisceration of the experimental use doctrine, formerly
thought to generally exempt academic researchers from patent
infringement if their research was not commercial in nature. In
Madey v. Duke, 355 the Federal Circuit ruled that Duke University
could not claim that their infringement of Professor Madey’s
patents was defensible under an experimental use doctrine. 356 This
ruling essentially threw out any notion that academic institutions
had any legal right to avoid paying licensing fees on patents,
opening up the door to additional prosecution of academic
researchers who infringe on someone else’s intellectual property.
Universities, generally known to be risk averse, have responded to
this decision by making it more difficult for researchers to use
potentially proprietary tools and inventions.
Heller and Eisenberg predict that “[a]n anticommons in
biomedical research may be more likely to endure than in other
areas of intellectual property because of the high transaction costs
of bargaining, heterogeneous interests among owners, and
cognitive biases of researchers.” 357
In this proposed system, the flat relatively cheap license,
divorced from the inventor’s control and with minimal transaction
sorts of restrictions when they enter into agreements to give firms
access to their own tools.
Id.
354
Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 676–77
(1998).
355
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[R]egardless of whether a
particular institution or entity is engaged in an endeavor for commercial gain, so long as
the act is in furtherance of the alleged infringer’s legitimate business and is not solely for
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry, the act does not
qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense.”).
356
Id. at 1362.
357
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 352, at 701.
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costs, will allow even academic institutions to simply and easily
pay the license fee for use of patented innovation and not have to
worry about the threat of a lawsuit. Such a system could also
incorporate lower licensing rates for research institutions.
F. Streamlining the System
Under the current Bayh-Dole system there are typical
logjams in the technology transfer process that take up the valuable
research time of academic scientists. A non-exhaustive list would
include invention disclosures, complex negotiations, and the
drafting of patents and licensing contracts. To distinguish itself
from the current crop of Bayh-Dole-like systems, it is integral that
this proposed process guiding the patent from bench to license be
as streamlined and as straightforward as possible.
Practically speaking, the centralized technology transfer
office and/or its potential subsidiaries, can easily be overwhelmed
without a simple uncomplicated procedure to process the
potentially thousands of patent applications and licenses. A
backlog at these offices would hurt innovation by preventing
scientists from publicizing their data for fear of losing their patent
and grants and, additionally, by serving as a disincentive for
scientists to transfer their technology at all, recreating the effects of
the Bayh-Dole system that this process was designed to avoid.
With a streamlined process of commodifying innovation
through the centralized agency, researchers can worry less about
restrictions placed on publicizing their data, particularly in those
regions that do not benefit from the publication safe harbors. 358
Under the current Bayh-Dole system researchers often need to
clear their talks, presentations, and papers with the technology
transfer office so as to not disclose any IP. Such a disclosure often
destroys the ability to patent an innovation. The U.S. requires that
patents be filed within one year of the public disclosure of the
invention, and many foreign IP rights are immediately lost upon
public disclosure of IP prior to having a patent on file. 359 Under
358

See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); see also John A. Tessensohn & Shusaku Yamamoto,
Japan’s Novelty Grace Period Solves the Dilemma of ‘Publish and Perish’, 25 NATURE
BIOTECH. 55, 57 (2007).
359
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
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this proposed system patenting done by a dedicated team of
centralized professionals could lead to much quicker filing and less
hindrances on discussing current research.
Notwithstanding the desire to centralize the technology
transfer process, it is here that a local technology transfer office
would remain most useful. Without the need to create the next big
multimillion-dollar license deal, and with researchers proactively
choosing to commodify their research, one could imagine a
productive symbiotic relationship between technology transfer
professionals and scientists, even on a local level. And, to deal
with those scientists who want to forgo the grant incentives and
market their discovery on their own, local technology transfer
officers should look to relatively cheap local university
resources—i.e., law and business professors—to work with the
scientist to effectively market the discovery to keep costs down.
The system can be further streamlined, through the use of a
web portal that could allow for easy uploads of new innovations by
the researcher, and easily searched by industry with access to the
potentially vast number of patents that will be available through
the centralized office. Corporations could even have the option to
have the latest innovations in their field emailed to them as they
come into the centralized office, thus keeping industry up-to-date
on the latest academic innovations. IP licensing portals covering
small swaths of the IP universe are already in existence. The
possibility of creating a multi-tool database warehousing the bulk
of the inventions coming out of the entire university system would
seem to be very useful. 360
G. Long Term Implementation
To avoid unrealistic expectations, developing nations should
recognize and accommodate the relatively long time scales—
360

See, e.g., The iBridge Network, http://www.ibridgenetwork.org/iBridgeNetwork
(last visited Jan. 30, 2009) (“[A] program of the non-profit Kauffman Innovation
Network, Inc., provides the transparency and access to university developed innovations
that will lead to further advances and next-generation products. The Network aggregates
research materials, technologies, and discoveries in an online, easy-to-search forum—the
iBridge Web Site.”); see also IP Supermarket, http://ipsupermarket.com; UTEK
Knowledge Express, http://www.knowledgeexpress.com.
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potentially up to 20 years— involved in realizing positive returns
resulting from the implementation of any technology transfer
regime. 361
But there should be positive returns. “[I]t is widely accepted
that the process is of economic benefit. The many countries that
are investing resources in technology transfer development
confirm that there is widespread confidence that the investment is
worthwhile and generates a positive return.” 362 Universities,
agencies and countries should set up adequate benchmarks to
accurately monitor the situation and adapt it when necessary.
Without clear and feasible benchmarks, “[u]nrealistic expectations
of the benefits from technology transfer in smaller countries and
institutions can damage the innovation process and lead to
withdrawal of support—at the time when success may be just
around the corner.” 363
CONCLUSION
Bayh-Dole is still seen by many in the United States Congress
as a paradigmatic piece of legislation designed to bridge the divide
between the constitutional call to “promote the progress of science
and useful arts” and the methodology prescribed by the
constitution: “by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries” 364 In Bayh-Dole, Congress saw an approach that
could fund universities (a large producer of progress in science),
help them create from their science some useful arts through
promoting patenting and commercialization, and, through using its
power as a funding source, cabin the exclusive rights provided by
the Constitution, those same rights that promote science but also
may hamper it—principally through carving out government

361

A.D. Heher, Return on Investment in Innovation: Implications for Institutions and
National Agencies, 31 J. TECH. TRANSFER 403, 403 (2006).
362
Id. at 409.
363
Id. at 412–13.
364
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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march-in rights and the like. 365 Given that Bayh-Dole has not
noticeably increased funding to universities from industry, cannot
take much of the credit for the patenting culture in universities, and
hasn’t effectively cabined the exclusive rights of patents, Congress,
and countries interested in mimicking the Bayh-Dole legislation,
must come to terms with the only real spawn of Bayh-Dole—the
problematic technology transfer office.
“[E]arning licensing income from academic research is neither
a lucrative nor a reliable financial investment.” 366 Unfortunately,
it seems that many technology transfer offices act as if their goal is
to make money for the university. To this end, technology transfer
offices have numerous policies and regulations, many required to
comply with the regulatory requirements imposed by Bayh-Dole,
that attempt to structure and fit scientific discovery into a patentoriented process. This drive clashes head on with most scientists’
desire to not be regulated and just continue to do their research,
and, if and when desired, patent, but at their own pace. 367
Granted, Bayh-Dole gave scientists the opportunity to patent
their discoveries and innovation, and it probably has helped
promote innovation without devastatingly harming research.
Unfortunately, the present actions of technology transfer offices is
threatening to ruin any positive effects of Bayh-Dole and hamper
innovation. 368

365

See, e.g., John H. Raubitschek & Norman J. Latker, Reasonable Pricing—A New
Twist For March-In Rights Under The Bayh-Dole Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 149, 150 (2005). The government has never, in the history of Bayh-Dole,
exercised its march-in-rights and might never do so.
366
Sobolski et al., supra note 198, at 3138.
367
Freedom and the dearth of regulations are integral parts of what makes American
basic science research so successful. See, e.g., BUSH, supra note 75, at 19. (“It is chiefly
in these institutions that scientists may work in an atmosphere which is relatively free
from the adverse pressure of convention, prejudice, or commercial necessity . . . . All of
these factors are of great importance in the development of new knowledge, since much
of new knowledge is certain to arouse opposition because of its tendency to challenge
current beliefs or practice.”).
368
See Grose, supra note 15, at 18–19 (“Joe O’Brien, [a Hewlett Packard employee]
recall[s] an era that ended some 20 years ago . . . when corporate-sponsored research
contracts with university labs were casually reached over a cup of coffee with the faculty
member who would lead the investigation . . . ‘[one] could have a collegial dialogue with
faculty,’ and deals were quickly agreed upon. . . .”).
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Developing nations ought to look beyond importing BayhDole-like legislation. It will, more often than not, not be the
panacea for transforming their economies into innovation
powerhouses. This Article has attempted to show the minimal
effect that Bayh-Dole had on the American technology transfer
phenomenon and to highlight the particular characteristics of the
American university that allowed for the American successes.
This Article, in addition to providing suggestions for
gathering better and more useful data on the nature of the
American technology transfer system, promotes a radically
different type of system that should alleviate many of the negative
issues associated with the American system.
In 1995 the newly elected Republican Congress threatened
to significantly cut back on funding for granting agencies.
Responding to this threat, a number of Fortune 500 companies
took out an ad in the Washington Post stating that “large and small
companies in America, established and entrepreneurial, all depend
on two products of our research universities: new technologies and
well educated scientists and engineers.” 369 The proposed system
in this Article would help fund and commercialize new
technologies and, through direct grants to the researchers
themselves and not to the bureaucracies of the universities, help
fund the education of new scientists and engineers.

369

A Moment of Truth for America: An Open Letter to Congress from the Executives
of Some of America’s Leading Technology Companies (May 1995), available at
http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/lazowska/cra/ceo.letter.html.

